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NOTES
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES: FmUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
This year's LAWYER Economic Institutions and Values Survey is approached
from three viewpoints. Part I will cover common law remedies for shareholders
damaged by breaches of fiduciary responsibility committed by officers and directors
of corporations. Part II will survey state statutory attempts to regulate this problem;
and Part III will cover federal securities regulation, particularly as it pertains to
the prevention and regulation of so-called "conflicts of interest."
Part I. The Common Law
A. The fiduciary relation
The status of a director or an officer of a corporation is one which charac-
teristically involves the ability-in fact, the duty-of one person or group of persons
to use the property of others. This situation has invited innumerable attempts to
classify the relationship in terms of common law offices of varying degrees of
similarity.
At the outset, the case of one merely an officer of the corporation should be
recognized as that of agent (or sub-agent), because he owes his appointment, his
delegated power, and the continuance of his authority to the assent of the directors,
whose voice in the conduct of business is that of the corporation. The description
of directors involves a greater difficulty. They have been variously characterized as
analogous to trustees," agents, 2 fiduciaries,3 quasi-fiduciaries,4 and mandatories. 5 The
more common descriptions seem to be those of trustee or agent.,
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person
who holds title to the property to equitable duties to deal with the property for the
benefit of another person, which relationship arises as a result of manifestation of
intention to create it.7 The situation of the corporate director is readily distinguish-
able from that of the trustee because the corporation, not the director, holds the
legal title to the corporate property. It is a legal creature, the holder of title over
which the directors have control, but whose property is held in its own name. The
director, therefore, cannot properly be said to be a trustee in the common law
(i.e., equitable) sense."
Similarly, "agent" fails to describe adequately the factual situation. Agency is
the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent given one
person by another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act. The one who is to act is -the agent.9 If the
director is termed an agent and the corporation is thought of as principal, the
normal power situation is reversed, since the corporation is under control of the
directors. And, on the other hand, if the body of stockholders is thought of as
principal, the aspect of control fails, too, since the directors are not subject to the
direct will of the majority stockholders. The shareholders' remedy is through periodic
elections. Further, the quantum of the directors' authority is largely described by
statute, in contrast to the principal's normal capacity to define the delegated power."
1 Kohler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 721 (1862).
2 Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423, 426 (1940).
3 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793, 799 (1960).
4 Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516, 519 (1927).
5 Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 15 S.W. 448, 453 (1891).
6 Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U.L. REv. 12, 13-14 (1939);
5 COURENT LEGAL THOUGHT 263, 264 (1939).
7 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 1 (1958).
8 See generally Johnson, Corporate Directors as Trustees in Illinois, 23 ILL. L. REV.
653 (1929).
9 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS_§ 2 (1959).
10 See Part II, infra.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Even though these terms ate not strictly accurate, they are commonly used,
perhaps only to justify the imposition of a fiduciary duty on the corporate official.1
A better approach, it would seem, is to realize, as did a Minnesota court,-2 that
the position of director-of-a-corporation is sui generis, or, short of that candor, to
characterize him simply as a fiduciary.13
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe
as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?
And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?'14
There would seem to be little doubt that the corporate director is a fiduciary to
his corporation and that he must exercise good faith and refrain from placing
himself in a position where his self-interest might work toward the detriment of
the interests of the corporate entity.' 5
Similarly, there would seem to be no dispute that a director occupies a
fiduciary relation to the shareholders of the corporation as an aggregate and must
exercise care to protect their interests, and to treat alike the interests of all the
stockholders, whether members of the majority or the minority.'6
Beyond this point, diverse attitudes are encountered. Whether a corporate
director occupies a fiduciary relationship to individual stockholders of his corpora-
tion has provoked considerable dispute. The question has often arisen when the
director attempts to purchase stock from a corporate stockholder,17 but there is
nothing in the rule which so strictly limits the area of its operation.'"
The majority rule in this area does not hold the director to the responsibilities
and duties of a fiduciary in personal dealings with stockholders, since he is not
exercising a corporate function, and is therefore free to deal with them at arm's
length.' 9
The minority view would hold the director a fiduciary and require a full dis-
closure of pertinent official information tending to increase the value of the stock.2 0
A middle ground was established in Strong v. Repide.21 The "special facts"
or "special circumstances" doctrine therein enunciated requires disclosure of in-
formation such as'an assured sale, known to the officers but not to the stockholder,
and not ascertainable from the books. 22 A great number of courts profess to follow
the majority rule, indicated above, but append to its application the "special cir-
cumstances" exception.
23
The question to whom a corporate director is fiduciary will not be discussed
further at this point, since the Survey is limited to his duties toward the stock-
holders and the corporation. The subsequent sections deal with the specific obliga-
tions arising out of varied factual situations, classified on the basis of the possible
"conflicts of interest" described.
11 Johnson, op. cit. supra note 8, suggests that historically the need for the imposition
of a fiduciary duty was felt before any of the then-established "legal pigeonholes" was applied.
12 In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
13 Uhlman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 264.
14 Frankfurter, J., Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1942).
15 Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1960).
16 Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 127 A.2d 885 (1956).
17 Annot., Duty of Officer or Director of Corporation Toward One from Whom He Pur-
chases Stock, 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
18 Semble Kane v. Klos, 50 Wash. 2d 778, 314 P.2d 672 (1957), noted 13 Wyo. L. J.
140 (1959), wherein decision was said to have been based on the fiduciary duty to the in-
dividual shareholder.
19 American Trust Co. v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 98 P.2d
497 (1940); 3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 1168.1 (1947).
20 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959); Oliver
v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
21 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
22 Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 I1. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945).
23 E.g., Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y. Supp. 768, aff'd 262 N.Y. 567,
188 N.E. 67 (1933); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945).
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B. What obligations does a director owe as a fiduciary?
1. Director dealing with his own corporation
The control over another's property imposes upon the director a fiduciary
obligation but does not deprive him of any of the personal interest common to
economic man. The area of overlap, where a conflict of loyalties is likely to occur,
has been variously divided by the courts to give greater or lesser protection to the
corporation, in a direct ratio to their view of the "size" of the fiduciary obligation.
Accordingly, the burdens placed upon the director doing business with the corpora-
tion have been scaled to the courts' view of the dangers inherent in such a trans-
action. The recognition of the possible benefits accruing to the corporation from
such transactions has been offset to varying degrees by consideration of corporate
vulnerability.
Where a director deals immediately with his own company, the danger seems
greatest and one might expect the most strained restrictions. In England, the diffi-
culty has been resolved by a strict rule that contracts, between directors and the
corporation are voidable by the corporation. Directors are not allowed to assert
validity on the basis of the fairness of the transaction or their good faith. Regal V.
Gulliver'4 indicates that, as in the case of the trustee, the director will be strictly
liable for the profits of such a transaction, if, as in the case of an agent, a profit is
made without the knowledge of the principal. This confusion of doctrines results
in a readily understandable concept of broad fiduciary duty, whose incident is to
prevent dealings between director and company where the director is bargaining
on both sides. In the Regal case, neither the good faith of the director nor the im-
possibility of the company's investment in the transaction was a defense to the
corporation's suit for recovery of the profits, which suit resulted from knowledge
obtained through the fiduciary relationship. The House of Lords made it clear that
"this doctrine as to purchases by trustees, assignees, and persons having a confidential
character, stands much more upon general principles than upon the circumstances
of any individual case." 25 The plaintiff company has only to establish (1) that the
transaction was done in the course of the director's management, and in utilization
of their opportunities and special knowledge as directors; and (2) that it resulted
in a profit to the directors.2 This absolute bar against such transactions may be
avoided by obtaining the assent of the shareholders."
In a leading case, Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros.,26 which involved a
contract between the railway and Blaikie Brothers, a member of which was a
director of the railway company, the court said:
It may sometimes happen that the terms on which a trustee has dealt or
attempted to deal with the estate or interests of those for whom he is a
trustee have been as good as could be obtained from any other person;
they may even at the time have been better. But still so inflexible is the
rule that no inquiry on that subject is permitted.
This rule was applied in this country in some of the older cases29 and it appears
to have been prevailing in New York,30 but it is no longer applied there.31
This ability on the part of the corporation arbitrarily to avoid such a contract
gives the corporation sufficient protection from undesirable results. In doing that,
however, it discourages directors from entering into transactions which may be
beneficial to the business organizations and which are completely fair and honest.
The disadvantages of the English position are largely eliminated by the
24 (1942). 1 All E. R. 378 (H.L.).
25 Id. at 386.
26 Id. at 392.
27 Id. at 394.
28 1 Macqueen's App. Css. (H.F.) 461 (Scot. 1854).
29 See, e.g., Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 Pac. 416 (1900).
30 Welch v. Woodruff, 3 N.Y. Supp. 622, 625 (1889), 1 MoRAwEzz, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONs 495 (2d ed. 1886).
31 Piccard v. Sperry, 48 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica
Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
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American rule32 which allows an interested director to contract with his corporation
and gives the contract an opportunity to operate free of corporate caprice so long
as the contract was considered by a disinterested quorum and approved by a voting
majority, and the director shows the fairness of the agreement.33
Where the above requirements are not met, the corporation may avoid the
transaction and need not show any actual injury in doing so.34 Some courts have
gone so far as to say that the corporation may avoid the transaction even though
there is no proof of loss. 35 Further, to the extent that it has been injured by the
director's deviation from his fiduciary duty to the corporation, it may seek its
remedy from the director involved.3 6
Thus as the court in Mardel Securities Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp.37
said in quoting from Rowland v. Kable:-8
The authorities are agreed that a director of a private corporation cannot
directly or indirectly, in any transaction in which he is under a duty to
guard the interests of the corporation, acquire any personal advantage, or
make any profit for himself, and if he does so, he may be compelled to
account therefor to the corporation. This does not mean that he may not
deal with his corporation or sell his property to the corporation if the
transactions are open, fair and honest, and the corporation is represented
by competent and authorized agents. The unbending rule is that the
director must act in the utmost good faith, and this good faith forbids
placing himself in a position where his individual interest clashes with
his duty to his corporation. The purpose of the law is to secure fidelity
in the director. If, in violation of the general rule, he places himself in a
position in which he may be tempted, by his own private interest, to disre-
gard that of the corporation, his transactions are voidable at the option of
the corporation and may be set aside without showing actual injury. One
who is entrusted with the business of another cannot be allowed to make
that business an object of interest to himself.
This case involved a president-director, who was also a majority stockholder, and
who had used his position to cause the corporation to publish a newspaper which
the director owned and marketed in another city. As alleged by the plaintiff-minority
stockholder, the corporation absorbed the losses, but the director retained the profits.
The court, in finding for the plaintiff, pointed to the director's failure to sustain
the burden of proving the fairness and bona fide nature of the transaction.39
Where there are enough directors to constitute a quorum and to pass the
measure with the requisite majority normally required, independent of the interested
director, the American rule holds the contract valid so long as the interested director
is successful in sustaining the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction.
Where the interested director is essential to satisfy the quorum requirements or to
carry the measure, it becomes voidable upon the election of the corporation. 40 The
validity of such a transaction has been upheld, however, merely on a finding of
fairness; in such a case the corporation is bound.41 Thus the inherent fairness of
the transaction is a crucial element and, although the same may usually be said
for the other general requirement, it is not an indispensable element.
A third and so-called liberal rule places the burden of proof on the party
32 The primary value of the English rule is said to be its certainty. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS
258 (1959). See 1 Morawitz, op. cit. supra note 30, at § 511. See 83 U. PA. L. REv. 56(1934), 6 IND. L.J. 413 (1931), and 29 COLUM. L. REv. 338 (1929), for differing approaches
to these rules.
33 Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943); Winger v. Chicago
City Bank and Trust Co., 394 II. 94, 67 N.E.2d 265 (1946).
34 Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42 N.W.2d 144 (1950).
35 Cornale v. Stewart Stamping Corp., 129 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1954); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325
Pa. 187, 189 At. 320 (1937).
36 See Part III, infra.
37 183 F. Supp. 7, 14-15 (E.D. Va. 1960).
38 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633, 642 (1940).
39 Mardel Securities, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1960).
40 Federal Mortgage Co. v. Simes, 210 Wis. 139, 245 N.W. 169, 173 (1932).
41 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 173, § 69 (Rev. ed. 1946).
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seeking to avoid the transaction, the contract being considered valid in the absence
of fraud or unfairness. 42 While this view may once have prevailed 43 it can currently
be dismissed on the basis of unnecessary devotion to the cause of the director.
One writer" advocates a redefinition of the fairness test in terms of the di-
rector's conduct, namely: "Would reasonable and disinterested directors have con-
ducted themselves as did the particular directors?" As advantages to this change,
he points to the elimination of the hindsight of the court, informed by a knowledge
of misadventure unforeseeable at the time of the agreement, and, "as in the fairness
test, the answer would be determined by the court's discretionary weighing of the
particular facts of each case."
It would seem that regardless of the character of the fairness test the rules
regarding the quorum requirements and majority vote should be retained. Although
it can be argued that the mere fact that the interested party knows the other
directors may influence their vote, still the disinterested quorum requirements, and
majority vote independent of the interested director, are obstacles, even though not
complete ones, to free rein of the spoils system in corporate government. For the
same reason the fairness test is a fortiori necessary. Its use, independent of the other
mentioned rules, would seem to amount to elimination of existing safeguards
which are not unduly burdensome.
2. Director dealing with other corporations
This subdivision- is, in many ways, a mere extension of the preceding one. Here
concentration will be given to the activities of a director of Corporation A as he
deals with Corporation B, in cases where the director has some interest in Corpora-
tion B. This interest extends from bare ownership of stock to a conflicting director-
ship. Consideration will also be given to so-called "commercial bribery."
In regard to transactions between two corporations, there are three positions
on the director with a conflict of interest. The older view applies the English rule,' 5
which was seen in regard to contracts between an interested director and his
corporation. Under this rule, the contract between corporations having interlocking
directorates is voidable on the basis of the relationship between the corporations
alone, and the fact that the transaction was honest or fair or made in good faith
has no bearing on the outcome of the case.
Thus, in Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co. v. Manhattan Elevated Ry. Co.,46 the
rule was applied to allow avoidance of a contract between the two corporations,
because three of the directors of the plaintiff corporation were also directors of the
defendant. There the court stated, in reply to counsel's contention that the disability
of a director to contract with his own corporation did not extend to the case of a
contract between two corporations, some of whose directors held that office in each
corporation:
I can see no difference in principle between the case of a director contracting
with his corporation and that of directors of one corporation contracting
with themselves as directors of another corporation. The evils to be avoided
are the same; the temptations to a breach of trust are the same; the want of
independent action exists, and the divided allegiance is just as apparent. 47
This view as applied to the interlocking directorate situation is open to the same
criticism as mentioned in relation to transactions between the corporation and one
of its directors.
The majority view4 8 in the area of interlocking directorates is similar to that
42 Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922).
43 Ibid.
44 61 H.Av. L. REv. 335 (1948).
45 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Guliver, A.C. (1942), 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.); Aberdeen Ry.
v. Blaikie Bros., 1 Macqueen's App. Css. (H.F.) 461 (Scot. 1854).
46 11 Daly (N.Y.) 373, 11 Abb. N.C. 103 (Com. P1. 1884).
47 Id. at 503.
48 See, eg., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
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employed in the case of transactions between an interested director and his cor-
poration in that it does not hold such contracts voidable at the election of the
corporation, but rather it makes such contracts voidable unless the fairness4 9 of the
transaction is shown. It differs in that it does not require a disinterested quorum
or majority. Thus in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp.50 the court held
that the only basis for a corporation to avoid a contract between itself and another
corporation having common directors was the unfairness of the transaction. This
case involved a suit by a minority stockholder to recover, on behalf of the corpora-
tion, damages which it suffered as result of various dealings of the majority, and
principally the president, with other corporations of which certain directors of the
defendant corporation were directors. The court further pointed out, citing Geddes
v. Anaconda Copper Co.5 1 and Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co.," that
the burden of showing the fairness of the dealings rested upon the directors involved
and, since they had failed to sustain it, they were properly held to account to the
corporation for the profits received; the law presumed that their conduct amounted
to a breach of the fiduciary duty involved. Thus, in regard to which party has the
responsibility of showing the fairness of the transaction, this court followed the
majority rule.5 3 In doing so it pointed out that the minority rule,54 which places
the burden on the party seeking to upset the transaction, "places a premium on
sharp practices by the directors by putting the onus on their victims and would
tend to further separate management from ownership."' 5 5 On the other hand, the
majority rule protects the stockholders, but is not unduly burdensome on the di-
rectors or the corporation.
In Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood,8 the directors of a corporation con-
tracted with another corporation, in which they were interested by way of family
ties, to haul the bottle company's products, when that corporation was financially
able to purchase its own trucks. The court distinguished between a situation where
a director deals both for himself on the one hand and for the corporation on the
other, and that where a director represents himself and the corporation is repre-
sented by parties independent of the director. As to the latter the court said, "The
burden of proof is upon the director or officer who seeks to uphold the transaction,
not only to prove the good faith of the transaction, but also to show its inherent
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation. ' 57 In this case the court held the
defendants to have represented both themselves and the corporation; where that
occurs, it is well established that in the absence of ratification, or estoppel, and
full disclosure the transaction is voidable at the option of the corporation, without
proof of actual fraud or of actual injury to the corporation.
There is a third view58 in regard to interlocking directorates which requires a
disinterested quorum or majority vote in order to uphold the contract.
49 The general elements of the fairness test are said to be whether the corporation re-
ceived in the transaction full value in all the commodities purchased; the corporation's need
for the property; its ability to finance the purchase; whether the transaction was at the market
price, or below it, or constituted a better bargain than the corporation could otherwise have
obtained in dealing with others; whether there was a detriment to the corporation as a result
of the transaction; whether there was a possibility of corporate gain siphoned off by the di-
rectors directly or through corporations they controlled; and whether there was full dis-
closure - although neither disclosure nor shareholder assent can convert a dishonest trans-
action into a fair one. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d
793 (1960).
50 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
51 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
52 394 Ifl. 94, 67 N.E.2d 265 (1946).
53 Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 99, 89 So.2d 799 (1956); see gen-
erally Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1954).
54 Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 338, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
55 Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
56 228 Miss. 99, 89 So.2d 799 (1956).
57 Id. at 814.
58 Cf. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 261 Fed. 15 (6th Cir. 1918).
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In the area of commercial bribery it is generally held that a director who
receives any type of gift or bribe which may influence his official judgment in favor
of another corporation or another person to the disadvantage of the corporation
must account to the corporation for what he has received.59 This is just another
phase of the general attitude of the common law that a director owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and may not indulge in any practice which might result
in placing the corporate interest in a subordinate or secondary position to the per-
sonal interests of the director. Thus, where the manager of a furniture company,
who was building a private house for himself, received valuable mahogany and
walnut lumber, veneer and varnish from suppliers of the corporation, the manager
was held to account for the value of the property received. The court mentioned
that by accepting the gifts from companies in the relation of suppliers to the plaintiff
corporation the manager committed a breach of trust.60 The leading New York
case 61 in the area dealt with a corporate director who agreed to resign and turn
over control of the company to other individuals who paid money to the director
to reimburse him for money loaned to the corporation by way of notes which had
become uncollectible. The director was held to account for the money he received
in his official capacity.
In a later case6 2 in the same state, involving directors who sold stock, which
they held in their own right, at double the market price, the court, in denying
• motion to dismiss the complaint, pointed out:
A director generally does not violate his duty in selling his own stock
at a price above the prevailing market, instead of disclosing and affording
to the corporation the opportunity of disposing of its unissued stock upon
such advantageous terms. But where his acts are motivated by the aim of
placing a competitive concern in a position to dominate the corporation,
they clash with his duties as a fair and impartial director. And when the
execution of such an aim is furthered by the motive of personal gain, the
director who received such unlawful consideration must account to the
corporation for the moneys so received.
Anderson v. O'Briant6 3 dealt with a director who attempted to collect on a
note given him by another director for his interest in -the corporation upon sale
of all corporate assets, when he no longer had an interest in the corporation. The
court held that the plaintiff could not enforce the notes be6ause they were without
consideration and against public policy. The court commented further:
The principle requiring directors to account for secret profits also required
them to account for and surrender to the corporation any gifts, gra-
tuities, or bribes received by them for the purpose of influencing their
official action. If directors of a corporation receive a sum of iaoney as
a bribe for the doing of a certain act which may or may not be prejudicial
to their company, they are trustees in equity of the fund so corruptly re-
ceived, and the corporation may also proceed against them for any damages
it has thereby suffered.64
Instances of sales of corporate control have been treated as if they amounted
to commercial bribery.6 5 In these cases, the rule is generally that "the responsibility
of the fiduciary is not limited to a proper regard for the tangible balance sheet
assets of the corporation, but includes the dedication 6f his uncorrupted business
judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation, in any dealings which may adversely
affect it."66 Furthermore, "absolute and most scrupulous good faith is the very
essence of a director's obligation to his corporation. The first principle duty arising
from his official relation is to act in all things pertaining to his trust wholly for
59 Keystone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397, 107 At. 835, 837 (1919).
.60 Holland Furniture Co. v. Knooihuizen, 197 Mich. 241, 163 N.W. 884 (1917).
61 McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
62 Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y. Supp. 172 (1931).
63 3 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
64 Quoting 2 TnoMPsoN, CORPOarUONS § 1342 (3d ed. 1927).
65 Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1955).
66 Id. at 176.
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the benefit of his corporation. '0 7 As a practical matter, in situations where the
interested director deals with his own corporation either directly or indirectly, the
transaction normally involves some sort of contractual relationship between the
parties, a relationship in which, it would seem, a stringent degree of devotion to
the corporate interest is required.
3. A corporate director's outside activities
Without denying a director's responsibilities to those whom he represents, it
is necessary to indicate some area within which he may act for his own benefit. It
would seem that when he is dealing with "his" corporation he has a greater respon-
sibility to it and its owners than when he deals with an outsider, one who might
have dealt with the corporation had he not done business with the director. This
would appear to be so whether the director deals directly with the corporation or
indirectly, by way of an interlocking directorate. The problem may be reduced
to a basic conflict between the director's position of trust and confidence on the
one hand, and his freedom of enterprise on the other .6  Inextricably related to the
question is the fact that too great a restriction on directors may result in discourag-
ing competent men from taking directorships.6 9
An attempt toward protection of the corporation, and thus the stockholders,
has been evidenced where corporate directors sought to enforce a contract against
their corporation after the corporation had agreed to turn over a percentage of its
gross receipts to a third party in return for the right to manufacture and sell patented
articles. The directors involved had acquired the contract rights for themselves at
a time when the corporation was able to purchase the contract, but the court refused
to enforce the contract against the corporation, saying:
The directors of a corporation are intrusted with the management of its
business and property for the benefit of all the stockholders, and occupy
the position of trustees for the collective body of stockholders in respect
to such business. They are subject to the general rule which prevails in
regard to trusts and trustees, that they cannot use the trust property, or
their relation to it, for their own personal gain. It is their duty to ad-
minister the corporate affairs for the common benefit of all the stock-
holders, and exercise their best care, skill, and judgment in the manage-
ment of the corporate business solely in the interest of the corporation.
They cannot have or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in con-
flict with their duty as such trustees.70
A contrary attitude appeared in an action by stockholders to impress a trust
on certain oil leases which were held by the directors of an oil company, the leases
being obtained by the directors as a result of knowledge acquired through the cor-
poration.7 1 The court saw no reason why a director must be precluded from en-
gaging in the same or similar business if he has acted in good faith toward the
corporation and the stockholders.72 Conceding the rule that the director may not
deal with any matter involving his rights and duties as a director, and that he may
not profit at the expense of either corporation or stockholders, the court felt the
director was free to engage in an independent competitive business so long as he
violated no legal or moral duty which he owed the corporation.1 3 While this case
may be explained by allusion to the Montana Supreme Court's reluctance to over-
turn findings of fact by the trial court, it seems to indicate an unusual consideration
for the interests of the director.
In Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett,74 a former president and general manager
67 Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 169 N.E. 678, 682 (1930).
68 R. M. Ramsey, Director's Power to Compete with His Corporation, 18 IND. L.J. 293
(1943).
69 Ibid.
70 Farwell v. Pyle-National Elec. Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N.E. 449 (1919).
71 Greer v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929).
72 Id. at 626.
73 2 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS 853, § 1350 (3d ed. 1927).
74 48 F.2d 236 (S.D.N.D. Cal. 1931).
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was the sole stockholder of record of what was in effect a subsidiary of Red Top;
he had organized and operated a competing taxi company using the premises of
the subsidiary. The court paid lip service to the general rule that corporate direc-
tors are not barred from entering into an independent and competing business
merely because of their fiduciary status, but it upheld a decision imposing on the
defendant a constructive trust on the profits earned by the competing taxi busi-
ness. 75 The opinion noted that the general rule was subject to the qualification
that a director must act in good faith and may not injure the corporation by way
of competition.7
A Massachusetts court held 77 that corporate directors, who purchased and
operated a competing corporation after the complaining corporation declined to
purchase it, did not violate their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff corporation; the
court refused to impose a constructive trust on the acquired corporation."8 The
basis for denying the trust was that the breach of fiduciary duty did not occur in
the acquisition of the business, but in its operation. This case could have gone
the other way, as one commentato 9 points out, had it been established that the
directors acted in bad faith in using corporate facilities and in personally acquiring
an enterprise in the corporation's general line of business. The court's critic points
out that, when a director innocently purchases property and only later decides to
operate it competitively, compulsion to account for profits and an injunction re-
straining further competition would be enough; but where, as in this case, the
purchase is accompanied by an intent to compete, the purchase itself is wrongful and
a constructive trust should be imposed on the stock of the competing corporation.YO
In Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc.81 the corporation sought to restrain its
former manager from contracting with customers of the corporation. The court
declined to enjoin the defendant because the effect of such restraint would create
too great an impediment to competition in business and would deny the director
the right to engage in the advertising business. In a somewhat analogous situation
the Supreme Court of Arkansas 2 held the directors of an insurance agency liable
for damages to the corporation for causing a diversion of business from the com-
plaining corporation to another insurance agency owned by the defendants. The
court distinguished the Witmer cases 3 pointing out that, while a fiduciary of a
corporation may engage in a competing business after leaving his corporation in
the absence of contractual restriction, where the fiduciary relationship has not been
terminated the corresponding duty to refrain from doing anything which might
injure the corporation or "deprive it of the profit or advantage which his [the
defendants] skill, knowledge and ability might personally bring to it or enable it
to realize the reasonable exercise of its power."
8 4
New York appears to take a similar attitude toward this type of problem, as
is indicated in Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 5 where the court held former directors
of an advertising agency liable for damages resulting to that business from the solici-
tation of key employees of the agency for a similar business being organized by the
former directors prior to their resignation. This case, according to one writer,8 6
75 Ibid.
76 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 203, § 79 (Rev. ed. 1946).
77 Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
78 Ibid.
79 55 HAv. L. Rv. 866 (1942).
80 Ibid.
81 202 Ark. 470, 151 S.W.2d 971 (1941); cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d
661 (10th Cir. 1955).
82 Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
83 Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc., 202 Ark. 470, 151 S.W.2d 971 (1941).
84 Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802, 809 (1958).
85 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954).
86 39 IowA L. Rsv. 185 (1953).
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might also have gone the other way under an earlier New York decision. 7 There
an officer-director had essential influence with a necessary supplier because of his
skill in converting the raw material into the finished product; he left his corpora-
tion and engaged in a similar business in order to protect his own interests, thereby
forcing the corporation into liquidation. The court in the latter decision 8 found
no violation of the director's fiduciary duty. The commentator s 9 contends that it
could have reached a similar result in Duane Jones, where there was evidence90
that the president of the corporation, at one time, acquiesced in a withdrawal of
personnel, similar to the acquiescence of the plaintiff in the liquidation case.91
The gray area surrounding a director who engages in a competing business
was made somewhat less confusing in Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle,9 where
a director of an investment and brokerage business acquired, as part of a private
investment group, the stock of an ice and coal company which had been under
option to the complaining corporation. The principal corporation did not have
available the necessary resources to take advantage of the option and was legally
incapable of increasing its equity capital. The court decided in favor of the de-
fendant director, who had obtained an option from the owners of the ice business
to sell their stock for them on commission or to buy it for himself. The court found
that he was not precluded by his fiduciary position to the plaintiff from doing the
latter or, presumably, from doing the former, where the plaintiff was incapable
of so acting.
93
In contrast to the incapacity of the corporation to engage in the similar busi-
ness, it has been held94 that bad faith on the part of the director engaging in the
competing or similar business is not a crucial element to a recovery by the corpora-
tion. The crucial element seems to be that the fact that the similar business is
itself of such a nature that under the particular circumstances of the case it should
fairly belong to the corporation. This has been held to be sufficient to establish a
duty upon the directors to acquire it for the corporation.9
The rules governing competing or similar business are analogous, if not indis-
tinguishable in some cases, from the doctrine of corporate opportunity. In prac-
tical effect the similar business problem is a member of the corporate opportunity
genus. Thus, in this discussion, as well as in the discussion of competing or similar
business, the same general principles are relevant and the same conflict is present.
The cases uniformly point out that a director is in a fiduciary relationship to his
corporation and may do nothing to injure it or deprive it from business which it
would otherwise get.96 But the rule is, in application, far from absolute. As was
seen in the earlier discussion within this subdivision, there are situations where the
director may injure his corporation, even deprive it of business, with impunity,
because there are present sufficient reasons why the directors should be allowed to
act for himself.97
87 Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1947).
88 Ibid.
89 39 IOWA L. REV. 185 (1953).
90 Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954). Compare Renpak,
Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So.2d 642 (D. Ct. App. Fla. 1958), where the court upheld the
device of injunctive relief to a corporation seeking to restrain defendant director from pur-
suing competing business after leaving the corporation, when he had solicited customers of the
corporation prior to leaving it.
91 Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1947).
92 311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949).
93 Ibid.
94 Roseblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d 558 (1954).
95 Ibid.
96 Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning,
323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
97 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Wilcox, 230 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1955); Washer v. Seager, 272
App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1947).
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In regard to the corporate opportunity doctrine, it may fairly be said that the
director may not acquire for himself any business opportunity in which the cor-
poration has an interest, actual or reasonably expectable,"8 in property. The rule
is otherwise conditioned99 whether the purchase of property by the officer or director
may hinder or defeat the plans and purposes of the corporation in carrying on the
development of the legitimate business for which it was created.100 The cases
commonly say that, when a business opportunity comes to the director personally,
he may deal with it on a purely personal basis without violating any obligation to
offer it to the corporation.' 0' The corollary is that, where the business opportunity
comes to the director in his capacity as a director, he must treat it as belonging 'to
the corporation and may not deal with it himself. 02
The earliest application of this rule seems to have been in real property cases,
where the director appropriated for his own use a lease which the corporation was
either seeking or could use to its advantage. 0 In this area another common appli-
cation is where the director purchases land for which the corporation was nego-
tiating or, at least, would have been willing to negotiate. Thus the rule developed
that the doctrine applied only to the acquisition of property'0 by the director.
Current jurisprudence is far from being restricted by such narrow bounds;
in recent years the rule has been applied to a situation where the director acquires,
for his own use, a contract for manufacture and sale of goods which would other-
wise belong to the corporation. 0 5 As seen earlier the doctrine is applied in instances
of competing or similar business by the director. 0 6 It has been applied where the
director not only takes corporate business for his own, but uses the corporate facili-
ties to do so.'0 7 In a rather unique case 10 the plaintiff attempted to invoke the
rule to acquire an additional sum from a director, who was her former husband.
She was suing for a property settlement, pursuant to an agreement which required
him to pay her 25 per cent of all the money he received from the corporation.
The plaintiff alleged misappropriation of a corporate opportunity; the result is
authority for the proposition that the corporation, or at least one representing the
corporation, is the only party capable of invoking the rule.0 9
The cases are in general agreement on a test for finding a special duty on the
part of the officer or director to act or contract as a representative of the corpora-
tion:210 The answer to this question naturally turns on the facts of each particular
case, but certain general factual situations have been held to preclude a duty on the
part of the director. One such defense was mentioned earlier, namely the legal
inability"a of the corporation to avail itself of the opportunity. When this is
present the director is free to put the opportunity to his own use. Where the cor-
poration has been offered the opportunity, but has declined to use it, the courts
have held the director under no obligation to the corporation to refrain from
exploiting the opportunity to his own advantage."' Although there is authority
98 Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Oh. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
99 Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1956).
100 See generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); Wendt v.
Fisher, 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926); American Investment Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134
F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955).
101 Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1955); Daloisio v. Penin-
sula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 127 A.2d 885 (1956).
102 H. C. Girard Co. v. Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 227, 116 N.E. 572 (1917).
103 Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
104 Ibid.
105 Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952).
106 Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 213 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
107 Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 919 (1939).
108 New v. New, 148 Cal. App. 2d 372, 306 P.2d 987 (1957).
109 Ibid.
110 Westerly Theatre Operating Co. v. Pouzzner, 162 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1947); Guth
v. Loft, 23 Del. Oh. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
111 Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle, 311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949).
112 American Investment Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
to the effect that the corporation's financial inability to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity is a defense to a charge of appropriation of a corporate opportunity;"113 one
famous case held otherwise.
The decision in Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch 14 involved an action by a trustee
in bankruptcy to compel the defendant-directors 'to account for profits made from
a sale of stock which was purchased by them individually, according to an agree-
ment, when the bankrupt corporation was unable to do so. The court, in refusing
to recognize the financial inability of the corporation as a defense, commented
favorably on the rule s' which does not permit the directors of a solvent cbrpora-
tion, such as the bankrupt was at the time, from dealing in the opportunity, where
the corporation is financially unable to do so:
If the directors are uncertain whether the corporation can make the
necessary outlays, they need not embark upon the venture; if they do,
they may not substitute themselves for the corporation any place along
the line and divert possible benefits into their own pockets. 116
The court said, in regard to the contrary doctrine, that if directors are permitted
to justify their conduct because of corporate inability, there will be a temptation
to refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of the corporation; to the
extent that the corporation fails to meet its opportunities, personal opportunities
will be open to directors."17
Undoubtedly the object of this prophylactic rule is the protection of the cor-
poration, just as this is the object of the strict rule regarding a director's dealing
with his corporation. It would seem unnecessary and overly restrictive. Further,
a shift in the burden of proof -to the director, once the plaintiff-corporation had
established the corporation's interest "actual or in reasonable expectancy,""18 to
prove that he had acted in good faith and with due devotion to the interests of the
corporation, would sufficiently safeguard the interests of the corporation and its.
stockholders. This would differ from the shift in the burden of proof as occurred
in Perlman v. Feldman,' 9 where after the plaintiff established prima facie that
the opportunity appropriated was one within the interest of the corporation, it was
incumbent upon 'the. defendant to refute this position and show that there was no
possibility of corporate gain. In Perlman, 0 the court refused to accept the absence
of fraud, of misuse of confidential information, or of outright looting of a helpless
corporation, as defenses to the charged misappropriation of corporate opportunity.
Under the proposed rule, the court would be bound to accept a showing of good
faith and due devotion to the interests of the corporation as a defense to the charged
violation of fiduciary duty. While the objection may be made that good faith is
irrelevant, still the law respects the good faith of the directors in other areas, under
the business judgment rule. The change would bring a degree of flexibility into
the law, but because of the difficulty in overcoming the presumption of bad faith
and complete devotion to his self-interest, because of the difficulty in proof, a
director would be more cautious in taking advantage of questionable opportunities.
The objection of uncertainty might be raised, but the mere fact of such uncertainty
would tend to make the directors more cautious in this regard. It would not dis-
courage competent potential directors any more than does the rule of Irving Trust
Co.
In regard to the burden of proof placed upon the complaining corporation
to show its interest in the opportunity appropriated, it should not be difficult to
113 Grand Amusement Co. v. Palladium Amusement Co., 315 Mo. 907, 287 S.W. 438
(1926); Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, 153 S.W. 50 (1913).
114 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
115 Wing v. Dillingham, 239 Fed. 54 (5th Cir. 1917).
116 Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934).
117 Id. at 124.
118 Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1956).
119 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); cf. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S.
590 (1921).
120 Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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show the corporation's actual interest where such exists; rather the problem would
seem to arise in showing a reasonable expectancy. As to this it has been held that
the corporation must show "not only that the properties in question possessed value
to it, but that it had a practical, not a mere theoretical, use therefor."P 1 It has
been held that the rule which gives a court of equity the power to impress a con-
structive trust on property which is the product of the appropriation of a business
opportunity by a corporate director is not satisfied by proof that after such appro-
priation the property would have been useful in the corporation's business?
2 2
Throughout this discussion mention has been made of the corporation's
bringing action against directors for an accounting of profits, and impression of
constructive trusts upon property, funds or stock. It is generally accepted that,
pursuant to equitable principles, the corporation'2 3 may bring an action in equity
against the derelict director for an accounting for the profits made in the digression
from his fiduciary responsibilities. Thus, the court pointed out in In re The Van
Swerington Co., "where the directors of a corporation, contrary to their fiduciary
duty, have made a personal profit in their dealings with the corporation, equity
will compel them to account to the corporation for such profits made at its ex-
pense."'124 The extent to which such a director may be held accountable for profits
so acquired has been said to be limited to the direct product which he receives from
the property. 25 It has been further held that the director is accountable, outside of
proper consideration and expenses and for any advantage gained, either in perform-
ing his duties or in betraying his trust 28
In Arneman v. Arneman,"7 the plaintiff-stockholder, in a corporation in which
the defendant, who was the plaintiff's brother, owned the balance of the stock,
sought a decree ordering -the imposition of a trust in his favor upon a one-half
interest in the company. The court pointed out, in reversing a decree for the
defendant, that
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such cir-
cumstances that the holder of legal title may not in good conscience re-
tain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.' 28
Thus the court inferred that this remedy is available as against a delinquent director.
In addition to the equitable relief available as against unfaithful directors,
there are two general legal remedies which may be invoked against the director,
depending upon the factual situation involved.
The action at law for damages129 is available against the director who has
breached his fiduciary obligation to the corporation through neglect or mismanage-
ment. Similarly it is available for damages caused by unauthorized acts."30 Where
the sum sought to be recovered from the director is known, there is no need for an
accounting in equity,' 1' and the proper action for relief against the director is an
action at law for money had and received.
121 Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 17 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935).
122 Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. Supp. 281, 56 N.E.2d
705 (1944).
123 In the remainder of this section "corporation" shall be used as including parties stand-
ing in the place of the corporation.
124 119 F.2d 231, 235 (6th Cir. 1941).
125 RESTATEmENT, REsTITUTioN § 205 (1937); Equity Corp. v. Groves, 294 N.Y. 8, 60
N.E.2d 19 (1945).
126 Electronic Development Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130 (1947).
127 43 Wash. 2d 787, 264 P.2d 256 (1953).
128 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919);
see also, as to impression of trust on corporate stock, Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.
1948); as to injunctions, Bowman Shoe Co. v. Bowman, 21 Ill. App. 2d 423, 158 N.E.2d 112
(1959).
129 Regional Land Corp. v. McLaughlin, 334 Mass. 276, 135 N.E.2d 24 (1956).
130 Minster Loan & Savings Co. v. Laufersweiler, 67 Ohio App. 375, 36 N.E.2d 895
(1940).




In concluding this portion of the survey it may be pointed out that it would
seem to make little difference whether a director is called a trustee, a quasi-trustee,
or an agent, so long as it is recognized that he owes a fiduciary obligation to "his"
corporation, to its shareholders as an aggregate, and, at least in certain instances,
to the stockholders individually. The classification of a director's status as sui
generizs3 would seem the most accurate.
In regard to the questions, "What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary, and
in what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations, and what are the con-
sequences of his deviations from duty?1 133 it can only be mentioned, recalling the
preceding discussion, that these are largely questions of fact to be determined in
each individual case.
William E. Kelly
II STATE STATUTORY REGULATION
The problem of a director's conflict of interest has received limited attention
from state legislatures. Perhaps the comparative lack of statutory regulation in this
area can best be explained by a brief look at the different philosophies behind
corporation acts at the various stages in their historical development.'
The ancestors of modem American corporations were British trading com-
panies chartered by the Crown. The early American charter grants emulated the
English, continuing the practice of allowing the corporate form only by special
acts of the state legislature, a "close to the vest" policy possibly engendered by dis-
trust of the corporate form's British origin and limited liability.
The gradual switch to general charters saw the same restrictiveness; it was
Aot until the latter part of the 19th century that the first liberalizing wave was felt.
The practice of "charter-mongering," whereby states made incorporation attractive
in order to obtain additional tax dollars, came into favor; Delaware and New
Jersey drafted the most liberal acts. Though these acts' may have accomplished
little else, they at least inspired modernization in other states.
Beginning in 1927, a new series of corporation laws was enacted. Such legisla-
tion as the Uniform Business Corporations Act, the Illinois Corporation Act, and
the California Corporation Code provided models for those states which lagged
behind in statutory revision. It can safely be said that the dominant theory of
present corporation law, the "enabling act theory," is that most of the responsibility
for corporate control should be placed on the corporation itself. There remain those,
however, who regard the corporation as a quasi-public entity, possessing a social
conscience and existing for the good of and subject to the community. These are
the opposite poles.2 In the following portions of this survey, the predominance of
132 In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 288 (1950).
133 Securities Exch. Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 580, 85-86 (1942).
1 See generally, Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412 (1952).
2 Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB.
177 (1958).
3 ALA. CODE tit. 10 § 21(24) (Supp. 1959); ALrsK CoMp. LAws ANN. § 36-1-91
(Supp. 1959); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-191(B) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-401 (1957);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-1 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1953); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.09 (1956); ILL. REv. STAT. 32 § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-208 (1960); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 17§ 3101 (1949); MAINE REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 53 § 32 (Supp. 1959); MD. ANN. CODE
ART. 23 § 52 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156 § 21 (1959); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 35-1.310
(1952); MONT. Rv. CODES ANN. § 15-401 (1955); NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 21-111 (1954);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:89 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14.7-1 (1937); OHIO RaV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59 (Page Supp. 1960); N.D. CODE ANN. § 10-19-36 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-2-14 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.180 (1959); S.D. CODE § 11.0705 (1939); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-401 (1955); Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACT ART. 2.31 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. §
16-2-21 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-35 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180-30 (1957); Wyo.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 17-12 (Supp. 1959).
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the enabling act theory will be illustrated in a survey of the manner of state statu-
tory regulation of the conflict of interest problem.
Thirty-one states3 have statutes providing for the creation of a board of direc-
tors in which corporate management powers are to reside. In the corporation acts
of 32 states,4 no mention is made, either of the relation and duty or the liability
of a director to his corporation, for actions taken in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, in circumstances involving a conflict of interest. While provision is often made
with respect to declaring dividends, issuing stock, and filing reports,5 director con-
duct in the day-to-day course of business is not covered.
Further evidence of this lack of restriction on directors is found in the similar
treatment of this area by the Model Business Corporation Act.6 Work on this act
was begun in 1940. A workable model was completed in 1946, and this draft was
again revised in 1950. Although there has been some unfavorable comment, 7 the
act has been generally well received. It is a typical example of a statute which
does not attempt to extensively regulate a corporation's business affairs. Iowa be-
came the most recent adherent of the enabling theory in July of 1959, when it
repealed its antiquated code."
Thus it would appear that the majority of state legislatures have not felt that
the common law rules are insufficient shareholder protection against directors'
abuses.
The common law definition of a fiduciary and his duties have been described.9
Legislatures in some states, however, did not feel that the common law rules pro-
vided adequate shareholder protection. The Uniform Business Corporations Act
sets out the definition of the director as a fiduciary, in section 33:10 The reason for
this section was given in the commissioners' note.
It is believed that the paragraph constituting the present section 33 has
an appropriate place in a uniform corporation act in view of the un-
settled state of the case upon the question of the standard of care and
skill to which directors are held.'1
This section seems to embody the common law but certainly makes no great strides
toward combatting the problem of conflicts of interest. The statute is neither
remedial nor preventive; at best it seems to indicate an awareness of the problem.
The nine states'12 adopting this section of the Uniform Act, or one closely resemb-
ling it, have applied it to various situations,' 3 but the net effect of these decisions
remains the same as it would have been at common law without any mention of
the statute.' 4 New terminology does not alter the elements of duty.
New York has been more precise in codifying common law corporate regula-
tion. Section 60 of the New York General Corporations Code 5 enumerates causes
4 Those states mentioned in the previous note and Hawaii.
5 E.g., ILL. R~v. STAT. 32 § 157.42 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
6 Section 33.
7 Harris, The Model Business Incorporation Act - Invitation to Irresponsibility? 50
Nw. U.L. Rav. 1 (1955).
8 IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1960); see generally Cosson, The Iowa Business
Corporation Act, 45 IowA L. REv. 12, (1959).
9 Part I, supra.
10 UNIFoR BusiNEss CORPORATION ACT § 33:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions
in good faith, and with that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.
11 9 UMFopiiu LAws ANN. 186 (1957)
12 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-142 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.365 (1955); LA. REv.
STAT. § 12.36 (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.47 (Supp. 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.31
(1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34 (1953); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.360 (1959).
13 E.g., Melgard v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., Inc., 73 Idaho 265, 251 P.2d 546 (1952);
Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947).
14 Part I, supra.
15 N.Y. GEN. CoRP,. § 60 (1943).
An action may be brought against one or more of the directors or officers
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of action against erring directors. But even New York has failed to place any
affirmative duty on the corporate management; it has merely codified the actions
a plaintiff would have had at common law.' Georgia's statute closely resembles
New York's in providing safeguards for the protection of minority stockholders.
The statute17 is generally declaratory of common law, and as in New York, no
affirmative obligations are placed on the director.
One of the most widely acclaimed state regulatory statutes is section 82018 of
the California Corporation Code, adopted in 1931. It has since been adopted in
tato by Nevada. 9 The drafters of this section realized that a director's personal
interest would not necessarily make a contract disadvantageous to the corporation.
Usually, full disclosure and subsequent ratification by disinterested director or share-
holder majorities are adequate to keep such contracts from being declared void.
In addition, subsection (c) provides that showing the contract to be "just and
reasonable to the corporation at the time it is authorized or approved" frees the
of a corporation to procure judgment for the following relief or any part
thereof:
1. To compel the defendants to account for their official conduct,
including any neglect of or failure to perform their duties, in the manage-
ment and disposition of the funds and property, committed to their charge.
2. To compel them to pay to the corporation, or to its creditors,
any money and the value of any property, which they have acquired to
themselves, or transferred to others, or lost, or wasted, by or through any
neglect of or failure to perform or other violation of their duties.
3. To suspend a defendant from exercising his office, for an abuse
of his trust.
4. To remove a defendant from office and to direct the filling of
the vacancy in accordance with the charter and by-laws of the corpora-
tion, or, if they contain no provision therefor, in such manner as the court
shall direct.
5. To set aside a transfer of property, made by one or more directors
or officers of a corporation, contrary to a provision of law, where the
transferee knew the purpose of the transfer.
6. To enjoin such a transfer where there is good reason to apprehend
that it will be made.
16 "However, these sections (§§ 60-61) do not create any new causes of action, except
as to the removal and suspension of directors, and the rights and remedies conferred are
cumulative and not exclusive rights." 3 WHlT, NEw YoRK CORPORATIONS § 60(D), p. 59
(12th ed. 1947).
17 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-711 (1935).
18 Duty to act in good faith; effect of personal financial interest or common
directorship. Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good
faith, and with a view to the interests of the corporation. No contract
or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its di-
rectors, or between a corporation and any corporation, firm, or associa-
tion in which one or more of its directors are directors or are financially
interested, is either void or voidable because such director or directors
are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee there-
of which authorizes or approves the contract or transaction, or because
his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if the circumstances
specified in any of the following subdivisions exist:
(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is dis-
dosed or known to the board of directors or committee and noted in
the minutes, and the board or committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies
the contract or transaction in good faith by a vote sufficient for the pur-
pose without counting the vote or votes of such director or directors.
(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is dis-
closed or known to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the con-
tract or transaction in good faith by a majority vote or written con-
sent of shareholders entitled to vote.
(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corpora-
tion at the time it is authorized or approved.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a com-
mittee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or trans-
action.
19 NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.140 (1959).
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contract from the ratification procedures. 20 - Through this provision a corporation
may avail itself of advantageous dealings procured through its directors and still
have some protection against behind-the-scenes transactions. 21 Obviously, problems
arise in a closely-held corporation where directors with similar interests might ratify
measures for their own self-interest in opposition to the shareholder's interest. Pro-
tection against this possibility is set out in the introductory sentence of this section
which restates the director's fiduciary duty.22
The force of the duty-to-act-in-good-faith provision is illustrated in Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.0 2  Defendants had formed a separate sales
corporation to market the product of the plaintiff corporation, of which they were
also directors. The contracts entered into were not fair and reasonable and thus
their validity depended upon ratification by the shareholders under § 820 (b); the
interested directors were incapable of ratification under § 820 (a). By these con-
tracts the defendants had reaped large profits but had also literally complied with
the disclosure and ratification provisions of section 820. Nevertheless, this dis-
closure was held to be insufficient to satisfy the first sentence of section 820, which
requires that the directors act in good faith, with a view to the interests of the
corporation.24 The court stated:
It would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to hold-that be-
cause the majority directors or stockholders disclose their purpose and
interest, they may strip a corporation of its assets to their own financial
advantage, and that the minority is without legal redress.25
The court had already indicated the limitation placed on section 820 by the "good
faith" provision: "That section does not operate to limit the fiduciary duties owed
by directors to all the shareholders .... ,,26
The Remillard opinion was quoted extensively in Kennerson v. Burbank
Amusement Co.27 Here one director sued for breach of an employment contract
through which the board had effectively sacrificed control over the corporate assets.
The court once again reasoned that ratification without good faith is not sufficient;
the contract was unenforceable. Levin v. Levin28 illustrates the operation of the
ratification section. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant director was charging an
inadequate rental to a partnership in which the defendant director had an interest.
In addition, the plaintiff also alleged that defendant was receiving excessive com-
pensation. However, the court ruled that plaintiff's long acquiescence in, with
full knowledge of defendant's conduct constituted a ratification.
The most recent case in this area, Tevis v. Beigel42 underscores the utility of
the ratification procedures of section 820. Here a decision allowing plaintiffs to
recover secret profits realized by defendants through pipe sales at cut-rate prices
was overturned because defendants had not been allowed to offer proof of ratifi-
cation.
This statute and the line of expository opinions following it indicates an attempt
by the state of California to draw the line in the conflict of interest field where the
sin is actual, instead of insisting on a general delivery from all temptation. While
the section is not a gross intrusion into the inner workings of California corporations,
it shows an appreciation-perhaps too optimistic-of the important role of share-
20 Note 18, supra.
21 See comment. 51 MIfcH. L. REv. 705 (1953).
22 Note 18, supra.
23 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952)," discussed, 34 U. DET. LJ. 42 (1956).
24 BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 84, p. 104 (1949):
The fiduciary duty is not relaxed by this section to the extent that a di-
rector may obtain any unfair advantage or profit for himself by misrepresen-
tation, concealment, or undue influence.
25 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952).
26 Id.
27 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).
28 123 Cal. App. 2d 158, 266 P.2d 552 (1954).
29 174 Cal. App. 2d 246, 344 P.2d 360 (1959).
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holders and creditors in any prosperous business community. In effect, freedom
to contract is preserved inviolate, but there is statutory insistence upon the reality
of a two-party bargain. Section 820 of the California Code would seem to repre-
sent the best current legislation in this area. It has met with favorable comment
and is an excellent model for imitation."0
Connecticut has adopted a similar provision, effective January 1 of this year.3 1
One of the noteworthy differences in this statute and California's is the absence
of a clause establishing the director's fiduciary status.3 2 Whether this lack would
30 See generally, Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor
Protection, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958).
31 CONN. GEN. STAT. RyV. § 33-323 (1961):
(a) A contract or transaction between a corporation and a director
thereof or a member of his immediate family, or between a corporation
and any other corporation, firm or other organization in which a director
of the corporation and members of his immediate family have an interest,
shall not be voidable, and such director shall not incur any liability,
merely because such director is a party thereto or because of such family
relationship or interest, if: (1) Such family relationship or such interest,
if it is a substantial interest, is fully disclosed, and the contract or trans-
action is authorized by directors or other persons who have no sub-
stantial interest in such contract or transaction in such a manner as to
be effective without the vote, assent or presence of the director concerned,
and the contract or transaction is not manifestly unfair as to the corpora-
tion; or (2) such family relationship or such interest, if it is a substantial
interest, is fully disclosed, and the contract or transaction is approved by
the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of
the shares entitled to vote thereon; or (3) the contract or transaction
is not with the director or a member of his immediate family and any
such interest is not substantial, subject, however, to the provisions of
subsection (b) of this section, or (4) the contract or transaction is fair
as to the corporation.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a con-
tract or transaction between two corporations with one or more common
directors or officers shall not be voidable by a corporation, a party thereto
or by a person succeeding to, or otherwise entitled to exercise, the right
of the corporation merely because of such relationship, if: (1) The con-
tract or transaction is not manifestly unfair as to such corporation; or
(2) the contract or transaction is approved by the affirmative vote of
the holders of a majority of the voting power of the shares entitled to
vote thereon of such corporation.
(c) No contract or transaction shall be voidable merely because a
director of a corporation is a party thereto, or because of any relation-
ship or interest of the type described in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, except by a corporation a party thereto or by a person succeed-
ing to, or otherwise entitled to exercise, the right of any such corpora-
tion. In any proceeding to void such contract or transaction, the court
may, if it deems it equitable, rescind the contract or transaction in whole
or in part, or award damages, or both, but the rights of third parties
shall be protected.
(d) For the purposes of this section: (1) "Member of the immediate
family" means spouse, parents and children; (2) "substantial interest"
shall exclude: (i) The interest of a person in a corporation, firm or other
organization as a debt or equity holder therein where the debt or equity
held is less than ten per cent of the outstanding debt or equity, as the
case may be, of such corporation, firm or other organization; (ii) the
interest of a person in a corporation, firm or other organization by reason
of being a director, officer or employee, or their equivalents, thereof;
(iii) the interest of a director of a corporation or a member of his im-
mediate family in another corporation, firm or other organization which
arises by reason of the fact the corporation has a debt or equity interest
in such other corporation, firm or other organization; (3) any contract
or transaction between a corporation and a person, corporation, firm or
other organization made in the ordinary course of business at standard
prices or on terms not less favorable to the corporation than those offered
by the person, corporation, firm or other organization to others, shall
be prima facie fair.
32 Note 18, supra.
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change the outcome of a Connecticut case similar to Remillard s remains to be
seen, but it appears doubtful that it would. Perhaps the common law restrictions
on director conduct, if read into the Connecticut law, would be adequate to cope
with the situation. However, subsection (a) (1) provides that, even though the
contract in question has been approved by the directors, it must be shown that
"the contract or transaction is not manifestly unfair as to the corporation." This
clause would indicate that there, as in California, literal compliance with disclosure
and satisfaction procedures does not automatically relieve the interested director
from his obligation to be fair to the corporation. The Connecticut statute seems
more lenient than its California counterpart, in that it requires disclosure only of
substantial interests, as opposed to California's financial interest test.
The specificity of the Connecticut provisions should restrict its application.
The basic requirements of full disclosure and ratification are quite similar, and there
is no reason to suspect that cases will bring about different results.
The final subdivision describes what areas are not covered by the term "sub-
stantial interest."3 4 Subsection (d) excludes from the class of "substantial" interest,
holders those stockholders who hold less than 10 per cent of the corporation's
stock, directors not having some interest in addition to their positions as directors,
and any director whose interest in another corporation arises from something other
than the fact that his corporation has a debt or equity interest in such other cor-
poration. By making the exceptions, the Connecticut legislature seems to be attempt-
ing to limit regulation to areas where abuse is not likely to occur. All things con-
sidered, this statute takes a reasonably lenient approach; it should prove effective.
The North Carolina Business Corporations Act is a progressive enactment
combining the enabling act approach with adequate shareholder and creditor pro-
tection.3 5 This also seems true of North Carolina's coverage in. the interest conflict
field. The two sections regulating director, conduct, would seem equivalent to sec-
tion 820 of the California Code. The first section s6 provides for the disclosure of
an adverse interest followed by ratification in the usual manner by a disinterested
director majority or by a majority of the stockholders. The final subdivision 7
provides, as does California,38 that, in order for the contract not to be void or
voidable, absent ratification by informed and disinterested directors or shareholders,
it must be just and reasonable to the corporation at the time it is entered into or
approved. The other section39 establishes the director as a fiduciary in a manner
identical to those described earlier.4 0 It apparently is intended to perform the same
task as the introductory clause of the California statute.41 The only difference
between the two which could possibly be material is North Carolina's requirement
that disclosure be made of an "adverse interest." "Adverse interest" is more inclu-
sive than either California's "financial interest" or Connecticut's "substantial in-
terest." 4? This more stringent disclosure requirement should be favored, since it
provides fuller protection and yet does not burden directors with excessive reporting.
Common directorships pose a serious problem in the conflict of interest field.
There is an increased opportunity for a director's misconduct when he sits on the
boards of both parties to a transaction.13 However, statutes have not changed the
33 Note 23, supra.
34 Note 31, supra.
35 Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1958); Latty, Powers and Breckenridge, The Proposed North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26 (1954).
36 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1960).
37 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(3) (1960).
38 Note 18, supra.
39 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1960).
40 Note 18, supra.
41 Ibid.
42 Note 31, supra.
43 See generally, 23 CORNELL L. Q. 445 (1938).
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common law rule" that such contracts are not voidable per se. The Rhode Island
statute 5 states that a contract between two corporations having common directors
is voidable only if it would be voidable if made with a stranger. This statute is
unique in that it represents the only attempt the states have made to test voidability
by a criterion other than "fairness." There is no need for ratification until the
voidability has been established. Ratification can be accomplished by affirmative
vote of either non-common directors or a majority of stockholders. Actually this
section provides little or no shareholder protection, due to the great opportunity
for "rubber stamping" by a dominated directorate.
Besides providing for disclosure and ratification of contracts in which directors
have a "substantial interest," the comprehensive Connecticut statute devotes a
separate section to the voidability of contracts involving common directors." The
transaction will not be voided as long as it is not manifestly unfair or if it is approved
by a majority of the shareholders. Connecticut has established no criterion of void-
ability resembling the Rhode Island "stranger" test,47 apparently relying on the
corporation's independent judgment as to when its interests are being served.
Actually the Rhode Island voidability standard is no more objective than the Con-
necticut test; both involve subjective evaluations of fairness without hard and fast
criteria.
When the validity of an agreement is questioned in Michigan, the burden of
proving the fairness of such agreement is on the director asserting its validity."
The Michigan legislature omitted any reference to ratification procedures, but
Michigan courts have required that contracts involving interested directors must
be ratified by a disinterested director quorum.49
Vermont requires that a contract involving an interested director be approved
by a quorum in -the absence of the interested party. The statute states that the
directors must have acted in good faith and, if such good faith is attacked, the
burden is on the attackers to prove it.50
West Virginia presents a somewhat watered-down version of the preceding
statutes.51 The statute requires that an interested director may not vote or be
present at a meeting while the object of his interest is being considered. This sec-
tion would seem to presume some disclosure, but no sanctions are placed on the
directors for failure to make such disclosure. The legislature has omitted any men-
tion of a good-faith-in-dealing requirement, apparently relying on common law to
fill this gap. However, if a legislature is going to allow contracts in which a director
has an interest to stand, it might be wise to re-emphasize the good faith requirement.
None of the common directorship statutes relieve the director of his burden
of proving good faith when it is questioned and both Michigan and Vermont
explicitly place this burden on the director. This is the only way to insure share-
holder protection in a situation which easily lends itself to abuse.
The greatest weakness of state legislation in the conflict of interest field lies
in the lack of adequate sanctions and enforcement provisions. At common law the
remedy for director misconduct consisted of a shareholder derivative suit.52 If the
shareholder was victorious, the director was forced to disgorge his profits to the
corporation. Thus, even a successful dissenting shareholder shares only ratably in
the judgment, since in an action of this nature the corporation is a nominal plaintiff.
44 See Part I, supra.
45 R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-4-7 (1956).
46 Note 31, supra.
47 Note 45, supra.
48 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13 (5) (Supp. 1959).
49 Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936). Both this case
and its application to the statute are discussed in 34 U. DET. L.J. 42 (1956).
50 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 105 (1958).
51 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3081 (1955). Discussed, OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW,§§ 973, 974 (1959).
52 Part I, supra.
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Procedure of this sort cannot help but discourage shareholders from seeking to
correct a legitimate corporate wrong.
Nor have state legislatures seen fit to alleviate this situation. Several states have
enacted bonding statutes to combat vexatious suits by disgruntled shareholders.53
If the plaintiff loses, he forfeits his posted security. These requirements are nor-
mally placed on shareholders who have only a small minority interest. Yet cases
are likely to arise when such statutes as these may deprive a shareholder of his most
effective remedy, the derivative suit.
In addition, a director is often backed by an indemnification statute.54 If the
plaintiff fails to prove the director's neglect of duty, the director is reimbursed for
the costs of the litigation. In practice, statutes such as this would not seem to
encourage misconduct; the director must win in order to be made whole. On the
other hand, these provisions protect the director from heavy court costs when he
was not at fault.
New York is the only state which has strengthened the derivative suit. Section
615s places the cause of action in the Attorney General, the corporation, corporate
directors and officers, creditors, and receivers or trustees in bankruptcy. In con-
ferring a cause of action on the attorney general, the legislature has taken a step
forward in the protection of shareholder's rights. However, the attorney general's
action has been limited to cases where the "public" interest is involved. This restric-
tion accounts for the extremely limited use to which this provision has been put.5"
The shareholder's interests would be well served if the attorney general could be
called in to prosecute an action whenever it could be shown -that a requisite juris-
dictional amount was being called into question; and, secondly, whenever the cor-
poration being sued was one whose activities had a substantial bearing on public
affairs or welfare. To go further and force the attorney general to prosecute all
derivative suits would both overburden the attorney general in performing his other
duties, and would encourage strike suits.
If a plaintiff is successful in a derivative suit, the director is forced to reimburse
the corporation in the amount of all secret profits he has made through his dealings.
This weak remedy is no adequate deterrent to misconduct. However, the new
Connecticut statute provides a more extensive remedy:
In any proceeding to void such contract or transaction, the court may,
if it deems it equitable, rescind the contract or transaction in whole or in
part, or award damages, or both, but the rights of third parties shall be
protected.57
If a suing shareholder were to receive damages independent of a pro rata share in
the corporation's reimbursement, he would become an effective corporate watchdog.
Directors would, in effect, be forced to pay punitive damages for their neglect.
This Connecticut approach seems to be a fair one. The shareholder is rewarded
personally for his diligence, the corporate wrong is remedied, and the director is
punished. An effective civil remedy such as this would forestall any need for crim-
inal sanctions; the state would not be obliged to prosecute wrongs which are to a
53 E.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP. § 61(a) (1943); CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14.3-15 (1937).
54 E.g., Model Business Corporations Act § 4; CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (1955); N.Y.
GEN. CORP. §§ 63-68 (1943).
55 N.Y. GEN. CORP. § 61 (1943).
An action may be brought for the relief prescribed . . . by the attorney
general in behalf of the people of the state, or, except for the relief pre-
scribed in the third and fourth subdivisions, by the corporation or a creditor,
receiver or trustee in bankruptcy thereof, or by a director or officer of the
corporation.
Upon the application of either party the court shall make an order
directing the trial by jury of the issue of negligence, and for that purpose
the questions to be tried must be prepared and settled as prescribed in
section four hundred and twenty-nine of the Civil Procedure Act.
56 People v. Lowe, 117 N.Y. 175, 22 N.E. 1016, 1021 (1889).
57 Note 31, supra.
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large extent the private affair of the corporation. Traditionally, courts and legisla-
tures have given business discretion wide freedom. To attach criminal penalties for
what may be merely an abuse of discretion seems overly harsh.
Thus, at present, New York and Connecticut seem to have the necessary laws
to bring about more effective enforcement and remedies. However, to bring about
such results, New York must as mentioned above, broaden its use of the attorney
general's suit.
The state statutory picture is varied and inconsistent, if not exactly chaotic.
This variation suggests (1) a widespread acceptance of the enabling theory of cor-
porate control by government, and (2) a certain legislative faith in the corporation
as a vehicle of free enterprise. The continuing popularity of the enabling theory
is underscored by a dearth of restrictive state regulations.8 The theory, and statutes
enacted pursuant to it, have the advantage of being clear and workable; they are
attractive to prospective investors and to legislators, to the latter by sheer dint of
the fact that they encourage incorporation and thereby augment state revenue.
The American economy is based on the free enterprise concept, and the dom-
inant spirit of a free-enterprise economy underlies the enabling-theory motive be-
hind avoiding restrictive governmental regulation. By not imposing such harsh
penalties as criminal prosecution, the states seem to have reaffirmed their faith in
corporate self-regulation. Though a few mammoth corporations have taken on a
public character, 59 most lesser corporations remain vehicles of individual enter-
prise. Little or no attempt has been made to extend statute appropriate to public
utilities or firms with a large public interest to the average small corporation, thereby
making all corporations into quasi-public entities.
Nevertheless, abuses of corporate power exist, and shareholders should prob-
ably not have to bear the risk of director malfeasance. Thus, a combination of the
increased use of disclosure,60 more effective means of enforcement, 61 and stronger
civil sanctions 62 would provide strong shareholder safeguards and yet would not cur-
tail economic freedom. Provisions of this sort must be supplemented by the cor-
poration's greater awareness of its position in the public eye. Management must
realize that besides injuring the individual shareholder, abuses of shareholders' trust
cast an ugly and visible reflection on the corporation. The desire to foster good
public relations and greater trust among investors should act as a spur to insure
corporate self-regulation. If corporations wish to avoid additional governmental
control, it is their duty to clean their own houses. Reliance on the purely selfish
motive of self perpetuation should aid in accomplishing this end.
James K. Stucko
III FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
History and purpose of federal securities regulation
Following World War I the people of the United States, perhaps conditioned
by the wartime sale of Liberty Bonds, became increasingly security conscious.'
More Americans than ever were investing in commercial enterprises; prosperity
was everywhere and it seemed as though it would continue. The aggregate value
of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, September 1, 1929, was $89
billion. Then came the great stock market crash; in 1932 the aggregate value was
58 See generally OLECK, MODERN CoRPoATIoN LAw §§ 849-897 (1959) for a state-
by-state recapitulation of directors' statutory powers and duties.
59 See generally BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
60 Notes 18 and 31, supra.
61 Note 56, supra.
62 Note 31, supra.
1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 64 (1951).
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down to $15 billion.2 One of the first official acts on the part of President Roose-
velt, on March 29, 1933, was to send Congress a message urging it to enact a law
on the issuance of securities.
In May, 1933, the Securities Act became law as the result of an investigation
of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee begun in 1932.3 The Securities
Act of 1933 is primarily concerned with the issue of new securities. In applying
the act, the Securities Exchange Commission does not actually decide if a security
is good or bad; it merely requires that sufficient facts concerning the issuer are
disclosed so that the potential buyer will be enabled to make an intelligent choice
as to whether he should buy the securities offered. "Congress did not take away
from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool 'of himself.' It simply attempted
to prevent others from making a fool of him.' 4
On June 6, 1934, The Securities Exchange Act was enacted as a supple-
ment to the Securities Act of 1933. Whereas the emphasis of the latter
was upon the protection of purchasers of shares by requiring full dis-
closure of all relevant facts, the scope of the 1934 Act extended to actual
regulation of securities exchanges, persons affiliated with the exchanges, and
corporations whose shares were listed on the exchanges.5
The Securities Exchange Act, which applied only to those corporations listed
on the national securities exchanges, was designed to offer continuing protection
to the purchasers of listed securities. This continuing protection is in the form of
required annual and monthly reports and proxy statements which involve disclo-
sure of facts about a corporation deemed necessary to enable a shareholder to
evaluate his shareholdings.
The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act appears to extend beyond mere
disclosure of facts. It aims toward a more active shareholder participation in cor-
porate affairs. The provisions of the proxy statement required under this Act give
a security holder information, but they also offer safeguards to make certain that
his viewpoints are expressed as to how the corporation should be run. Rule X-14A-8,
under the proxy rules, allows a shareholder to include in the management's proxy
a statement of 100 words or less about an issue which can properly be raised at the
corporation's annual meeting. The proxy rules also require that the management
either give shareholder lists or mail out proxies of insurgent shareholders.
This interest of the SEC towards encouraging an actual shareholder's control
of the corporation, carried to its logical conclusion, would dictate a broader cov-
erage to include those investors and those transactions presently exempted.
The present SEC rules pertaining to conflicts of interest
The evil of secret profits is not the existence of profit, but the ignorance of its
existence by people who have a right to know about it. The SEC requires dis-
closure of certain relationships of corporate officials with regard to certain trans-
actions having a definite bearing on the soundness of the corporation, while inci-
dentally providing information which could be the basis of a derivative action for
the recovery of such profits.
In the solicitation of proxies, Item 7(f) of Schedule 14A6 requires that the
registrant: Describe briefly, and where practicable state the approximate amount
of, any. material interest, direct or indirect, of any of the following
persons in any material transactions since the beginning of the issuer's last
fiscal year, 7 or in any material proposed transactions, to which the issuer
2 Id. at 75.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 82.
5 9 ARx. L. Rv. 421 (1955).
6 17 C.F.R. Schedule 14A (Supp. 1960). Similar provisions are contained in Form S-1,
Item 20, and Form 10-K, Item 9. (Throughout this note, Form S-1 will be the form in
effect as of Feb. 20, 1958, and Form 10-K, as revised Jan. 28, '1954.)
7 Form S-1 requires disclosure of material interests in material transactions for the
past three years.
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or any of its subsidiaries was or is to be a party:
(1) Any director or officer of the issuer;
(2) Any nominee for election as a director;
(3) Any security holder named in answer to item 5(d)8; or
(4) Any associate of any of the foregoing persons.
The instructions following are more illuminating as to the exact requirements,
and some policy considerations. Instruction 2 provides:
As to any transaction involving the purchase or sale of assets by or
to the issuer or any subsidiary, otherwise than in the ordinary course of
business, state the cost of the assets to the purchaser and the cost thereof
to the seller if acquired by the seller within two years prior to the trans-
action.
It should be noted that this does not except any material transactions from
disclosure, but establishes a class of transactions where a fuller disclosure is required.
Inherent in this classification is the questionable judgment that the purchase and
sale of assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, is somehow more danger-
ous to the soundness of the company, or in the alternative that these are less likely
to come to the attention of the shareholders. Perhaps history, if not reason, sup-
ports the former judgment; the latter seems baseless.
Instruction 5 dispenses with the necessity of disclosure of any transaction or
interest therein in certain cases. Where the rates are fixed by law or determined
by competitive bidding, no report is necessary. Assuming a bona fide competition
in bids, this is a logical exception; there is no possibility of undue profits or of a
fraud on the corporation.
Similarly, where the interest in question is solely that of a director9 of another
corporation which is a party to the transaction, it need not be disclosed. Apparently,
when the conflict is not financial in nature, the difficulties of a metaphysical bisec-
tion of loyalty is not felt to be a concern of the investing community. There is no
disclosure required when the interest of the specified person does not exceed $30,000.O
This is a crystallization of the de minimis rule, and, while the administrative neces-
sity for such an exclusion might be admitted, the description of this "permissible
fraud" area in dollars fails to distinguish between the large and the small company
on a basis of relative importance. In addition, the possibility of a series of exempt
transactions is not covered, nor is there a clause which would require disclosure
where the combined interest of the directors, officers, or associates exceeds $30,000.
The latter difficulty may be merely loose wording. Item 9 under the annual
report' is substantially similar to this section of the proxy solicitation. There, how-
ever, the wording is changed to read, "the interest of the specified persons does not
exceed $30,000," which might be interpreted to require a disclosure where the
aggregate interest exceeds that sum.
Instruction 5 (v) provides that no information need be given as to any trans-
action or any interest therein where:
The transaction does not involve remuneration for services, directly
or indirectly, and (A) the interest of the specified persons arises from the
ownership individually and in the aggregate of less than 10% of any class
of equity securities of another corporation which is a party to the trans-
action, (B) the transaction is in the ordinary course of business of the
issuer or its subsidiaries, and (C) the amount of such transaction or series
of transactions is less than 10% of the total sales or purchases, as the
case may be, of the issuer and its subsidiaries. 1 2
It should be noted that the qualifications for non-disclosure under this para-
graph are conjunctive; therefore, the type of transaction which is permitted to
go unreported under this exception may be rather narrowly described. It is a pur-
8 Any person who owns of record or beneficially more than 10 per cent of the out-
standing securities of the issuer.
9 Rather than, for instance, being a shareholder and a director of the other corporation.
10 17 C.F.R. Schedule 14A, Item 7(f), Instruction 5(iv) (Supp. 1960).
11 Form 10-K.
12 17 G.F.R. Schedule 14A, Item 7(f) (Supp. 1960).
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chase or sale of goods in the ordinary course of business by a corporation whose
directors, officers, and their associates own in the aggregate less than 10 per cent
of the corporation which is the other party to the transaction, and this transaction
represents less than 10 per cent of the total sales or purchases, as the case may be,
of the first corporation and its subsidiaries. As to the justification for the area of
exclusion, the first consideration aims at the nature of the exclusion; the second at
its relative importance. There seems to be no reason for assuming more regularity
in the purchase or sale of goods in the ordinary course of business than in other
transactions. But, the interest in keeping the report a manageable size offsets any
interest in absolute completeness. The "10 per cent of 10 per cent" is this section's
version of de minimis. Rather than an expression of faith that men are not dis-
honest when dealing for small sums, it is justified to the extent that it minimizes
the amount of conflicting loyalties.
However, if the problem of aggregate interests of specified persons is answered
under this section, the possibility of a series of transactions exceeding the 10 per cent
going unreported remains.
Instruction 713 merely states that an interest in any transaction is riot required
to be reported "unless such interest and transaction are material." The term "ma-
terial" limits the information required to those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security
registered. 4 This qualification is no more vague than many other "reasonable men"
in the law and may be said to read into the instruction a requirement of good faith.
The provisions in the original registration form and the annual report are
similar. As might be expected, the current reports are less comprehensive and
intended as a means to keep other filed material up to date. If the registrant or
any of its majority-owned subsidiaries has acquired or disposed of a significant
amount of assets, otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, the following
information must be furnished:"5
a) The date and manner of acquisition or disposition and a brief
description of the assets involved, the nature and amount of considera-
tion given or received therefor, the principle followed in determining the
amount of such consideration, the identity of the persons from whom the
assets were acquired or to whom they were sold and the nature of any
material relationship between such persons and the registrant or any of
its affiliates, any director or officer of the registrant, or any associate of
any such director or officer.' 6
Instruction 2 gives a definition of acquisition and disposition excluding con-
struction or development of property. Instruction 3 states that the acquisition of
securities shall be deemed the indirect acquisition or disposition of the assets repre-
sented by such securities, if it results in the acquisition or disposition of control of
such assets.
Instruction 4 describes the rule for determining if 'an acquisition or disposition
involves a significant amount of assets:
(i) if the net book value of such assets or the amount paid or received
therefor upon such acquisition or disposition exceeded 15 per cent of the
total assets of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries, or (ii) if it
involved the acquisition or disposition of a business whose gross revenues
for its last fiscal year exceeded 15 per cent of the aggregate gross revenues
of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries for the registrant's last
fiscal year.
Possibly the reason for the distinction between the transactions "within the
ordinary course of business" and those "not within the ordinary course of business"
is that the SEC does not wish to overburden registered corporations by requiring
a review of all their transactions every month. The information concerning the
13 Ibid.
14 Definition, 17 C.F.R. 230.405; 17 O.F.R. 210.1-02.
15 Form 8-K, Item 2. (Form 8-K as in effect Mar. 5, 1959.)
16 Form 8-K, Item 2(a).
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interests of directors in transactions in the ordinary course of business appear to
be important enough to the shareholders to require disclosure. A shareholder
would want this information so he could take action immediately in order to stop
an unfair pilfering by a director.'7 To require a shareholder to wait until such
information is disclosed in the annual report could result in unrecoverable loss.
Instruction 4, calling only for the disclosure of an interest of a director in a trans-
action which involves mote than 15 per cent of the assets or 15 per cent of the
gross revenues, is subject to the objection that it, too, is an inelastic "de minimis"
rule; i.e., it allows a perhaps major event to go unreported. It might be pointed
out that a percentage exemption permits, in the case of a large company, a con-
siderable financial interest to be affected. Further, the limitation is not drawn in
terms of the individual's interest.
The information required in the general registration form, other than the
part similar to that set out above, includes information concerning the interests of
promoters in transactions involving assets purchased or about to be purchased by
the stock issuer, and anything of value that the promoters are to receive from the
registrant.' 8 This information is a secondary check on the activities of the directors,
if they happen to be the original promoters of the business. Information concerning
a director's occupations for the previous five years, required in the annual report",
and the proxy form,20 might also be an indication of possible conflicts of interest.
Contracts with businesses in which he was employed might be viewed with suspicion.
There are also requirements for the disclosure of remuneration of directors21
and their stock purchase options2 2 which might be important for the stockholder
to know, if he is to detect conflicts of interests among corporate directors.
Is the present SEC statute an effective deterrent to unfair transactions by interested
directors?
Outside of the special instances covered by the regulatory acts enforced by the
Commission,2 3 the SEC has no direct control over contracts made by corporate
directors. It cannot require Commission approval, or bring action, even in cases
of gross mismanagement. The power of the Commission to sue and regulate does
not appear to be necessary in the case of an ordinary corporation. By a disclosure
of all the pertinent information concerning the contracts of interested directors,
the investors themselves should, theoretically, be able to decide if they approve of
the transactions. This may be less effective than appears, however. Many stock-
holders or prospective stockholders never read the reports, and even if they did
read them, most investors would not understand their impact.
But it must be remembered that this information also goes to independent
experts who can interpret the mass of required information and make the results
known.24 "Probably the very best protection for investors will be the complete
disclosure of all facts which may affect the soundness of their investments. ' 25
Public officials cannot decide if a security is sound; they are not prophets. In the
dissenting opinion in State ex rel Circuit Attorney v. Saline County Court,26 the
17 See The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30, 1960, p. 1, col. 6. In the article cited, a two-
month profit of $450,000 by a director resulting from questionable dealings with his corpora-
tion was disclosed. This serves to show the need for frequent current reports.
18 Form S-1, § 11.
19 Form 10-K, Item 6(b).
20 17 C.F.R. Schedule 14A, Item 6(a)(2) (Supp. 1960).
21 E.g., Form S-I, Item 17; Form 10-K, Item 7; Reg. X-14, Item 7.
22 E.g., Form S-1, Item 18(b); Form 10-K, Item 3; Reg. X-14, Item 7.
23 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17.
24 MacChesney & O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the Securities Act, 4 LAW & CONTMP.
PROB. 133, 153 (1937).
25 Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L. Rv. 396, 417
(1936).
26 51 Mo. 350, 387 (1873).
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writer discusses the right of a prosecutor to sue for mismanagement; he notes that
when management is looking to a state's attorney for punishment, it is likely to
curry his favor rather than that of the owners. He feared the state would be in-
volved in expensive lawsuits, suits in which it would have no substantial interest.
Finally, he said, the institution of the suit could depend on nothing more than the
caprice of the attorney general. Such arguments would.appear to be applicable to
suits brought by the SEC.
The question that arises is whether a sufficient amount of information is re-
quired to be disclosed. Is it possible for shareholders to decide if management is
properly doing its job? There is very little case law to show how the disclosure
provisions set out above are interpreted.2 7 Generally, interpretation of these provi-
sions comes about when counsel for a registrant requests an interpretation from the
Division of Corporate Finance at the SEC in Washington. 28 These interpretations
are not made public, and they are strictly applicable only to the particular hypo-
thetical question submitted.29
The requirements of disclosure have been stated and briefly discussed above;
some areas of their inadequacy have been indicated. If the purpose of the SEC
is limited to the general soundness of the stock market, the limited coverage may
be justified. But if the legislation is seen as a remedy for shareholder ignorance as
a result of the separation of ownership and management, there are good grounds
for requiring fuller disclosure. The protection of the individual stockholder in this
case merits a disclosure of those matters dangerous to his investment. Considera-
tions of administrative practicability demand some limitation on the burdens of
disclosure imposed on the corporation, but the rules might be redrafted to achieve
greater individual protection.
Proposals to extend the jurisdiction of the SEC
The present SEC rules, under the 1933 and 1934 acts, however effective in
uncovering conflicts of interest among corporate directors they might be, extend
only to corporations which come under the statutes. The Securities Act of 1933
requires the registration of securities which are to be offered to the public through
the mails or the channels of interstate commerce.2 0 The Exchange Act of 1934
requires registration of an issuer who wants to trade on a national exchange.2 '
This in effect allows a company to choose for itself whether it wants to be governed
by the SEC rules.2 It may place its securities privately and avoid all the disclosure
regulations. Senators Frear and Fulbright have proposed bills which would place
companies having a stated amount of capital and a specified number of shareholders
under the rules of the SEC, without allusion to either commerce or stock exchange
requirements.2 2  It seems desirable that there be a single standard insuring all
security holders of information necessary to protect their interests. Such informa-
tion would possibly build confidence in business investments; it would also make
registered securities better collateral for loans. 4
It has been argued that compulsory registration would unduly burden businesses
seeking neither capital nor stock market listing. 5 However, a majority of the cor-
porations which would be included under the new provision would already have
27 This is discussed in Part III, supra.
28 See, e.g., Letter of Director of the Corporate Finance Division of the SEC (Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 3385, CCH FED. SEC. L. SERVICE '41-'44 Dec. 175,357).
29 THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT I-ANDBOOx 43 (1959).
30 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 83 (1951).
31 Id. at 84.
32 Id. at 615.
33 E.g., Hearings on S. 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182 Before a Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 86th 'Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Hearings on S. 2408 Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
34 186 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 182 (1956).
35 182 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 180 (1955).
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the records necessary for such registration.3 1 The extra cost to management would
be infinitesimal compared to the entire operation of the company.37 Required regis-
tration would eliminate, at least in the affected companies, abuses such as proxies
sent on the back of dividend checks (by endorsing the check a shareholder votes
his proxy); and requests for ratification of all transactions made between annual
meetings, with no disclosure as to what the transactions were.3 8 It would tend to
cut down the private placing of securities; the best securities would be available to
the public.3 9 No longer would a corporation be tempted to accept a single bid by
a party rather than offer its securities on the public market in order to avoid
registration. The adoption of the bill would make the decision whether or not to
list on a national exchange one based on economic considerations, rather than on
a desire to conceal operations. 40 There is no apparent reason why SEC protection
should be limited to the presently listed companies. The fraud upon stockholders
which the SEC seeks to prevent is just as likely to exist among nonlisted companies.
The shareholders of both need governmental protection - or neither needs it.
Whether or not all corporations should be regulated by the SEC, the Frear
bill looks into the practicalities of the matter. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission would have to be greatly enlarged to investigate the reports of every cor-
poration which sells securities in the United States. Since in a smaller corporation,
with few shareholders, the shareholders are likely to be not far removed from the
management, and there will not be a pressing need for formal reports, both the
Frear and Fulbright bills, with good reason, make SEC jurisdiction depend upon
the size of the corporation.
Uses of the information required
The information given in the registration forms, the annual forms, the monthly
forms, and the proxy forms - information required by SEC rules- could con-
ceivably be used as the basis for a stockholder's derivative action or, possibly, even
a suit by the corporation in its own name, the gravamen of which would be director
or officer misconduct.
A corporate director, as a fiduciary of his corporation, has a duty apart from
administrative reports to disclose his personal interest in a corporate transaction.4
Disclosure in this sense is essential to the fairness of the bargain; the SEC rules
requiring disclosure should further encourage a director to fulfil this duty. Failure
to disclose could subject an erring director both to the usual civil remedies for
corporate mismanagement, and to criminal liability under SEC penalties for non-
disclosure.4
2
Once a director has disclosed his interest in the corporate transaction, there
must be some way of determining if his power has been misused. If the board of
directors believes the transaction is unfair, in light of the director's disclosures, it
may discharge the director and either rescind the contract, or sue for the benefit
received by the interested director.43 In some jurisdictions this is possible even
though the corporation has not been injured in the transaction.44 The initial factor
is whether or not the director fully disclosed his interest in the transaction at the
time it was made.4"
36 Bayne, Around and Beyond the SEC - the Disenfranchised Shareholder, 26 IND. L.J.
207 (1951).
37 Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process:
The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387, 400 (1954).
38 Loss, op. cit. supra note 30, at 619.
39 177 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 1849 (1953).
40 71 HAv. L. REV. 1337 (1958).
41 Cf. Part I, supra.
42 Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78.
43 Cf. Part I, supra.
44 Cf. Part I, supra.
45 Ibid.
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If a stockholder institutes suit in the name of the corporation, he joins as
defendants the interested director and the corporation itself. A stockholder's deriva-
tive suit is a rather weak avenue to redressing improper director interest, because
the possible loss to the individual looms large as compared to any benefits return-
ing to him.
The preliminary requirements to bringing the suit may include proof that
the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time the action arose; a demand upon the
directors 6 and their refusal to bring the suit in the corporate name (or a showing
that such a demand would be useless) ; and a posting of bond by the shareholder.4 .
The normal, practical difficulties of proof, growing out of the fact that needed
evidence is in company files, may be complicated by the corporation's interposition
of a defense.48 Dependent upon the outcome, the shareholder may shoulder the
cost of the suit himself, and forfeit his bond;4 9 or he may recover the disputed profits
for the corporation. 0 In contrast, the defendant, if he successfully defends, retains
the profits from the contract and is reimbursed for his legal expenses.'
The difficulties inherent in derivative actions, and their absence of utility as
a judicial device for protecting shareholder-investors, have not escaped the notice
of commentators. Suggestions for substitutes have ranged from empowering the
state to act as nominal plaintiff in mismanagement cases to the maintenance of a
private organization whose sole function would be investigating corporate manage-
ment. The utility of the latter suggestion would, of course, depend on the cor-
poration's willingness to hire the management monitors.5 2 Some of the proponents
of this solution have suggested that government underwrite the function. Whatever
the merits of government investigation, it would not seem advisable to make of the
state a plaintiff in what is essentially a derivative action for a private wrong, i.e.,
mismanagement. The state's interest in the internal affairs of the average business
corporation would not seem to justify the public expense necessarily involved in
bringing such suits.53
Some sort of judicial action is necessary, however, if for no other reason than
the coercive effect it has upon management. An unsuccessful suit- or the bare
threat of suit-gives management a graphic reminder that its investors are dis-
satisfied; this reminder can conceivably encourage directors to prevent private profit
from corporate transactions, or even to cancel a conflict-of-interest contract rather
than suffer the expense and exposure of public trial.54
As long as private actions have this coercive effect on management, the like-
lihood that government will take over the derivative suit is not great. But a grow-
ing public awareness of mismanagement could result in government assistance to
shareholders whose private remedies are less than effective.55
46 In some states, a shareholder must make the demand on the other shareholders of the
corporation and obtain the consent of a majority of those who are disinterested. E.g., S.
Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99,
93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); but see Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1958).
47 This, in effect, sometimes makes the wealth of the shareholder determinative of his
rights. Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control - Securities for Expense Statutes, 63
H v. L. Rv. 476 (1950).
48 Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
49 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 157(a) (1946).
50 Berlack, Stockholder's Suits; a Possible Substitute, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 597 (1937); 61
HI- v. L. Rv. 335, 341 (1948).
51 Balantine, op. cit. supra note 49, § 157.
52 See Business Week, Oct. 8, 1960, p. 32.
53 See Circuit Attorney v. Saline County Court, 51 Mo. 350, 387 (1873) (dissenting
opinion).
54 The publicity resulting from such a suit will often codrce directors into taking positive
action to stop the taking of unfair profits. See Fortune, Nov., 1960, p. 132.
55 See Companies Act, 1954, 11 & 12, Geo. 6, c. 38 §§ 164-165; it has been suggested
that the state has a sufficient interest in corporate management because a large segment of
the population is composed of shareholders. 35 MIcH. L. REv. 597, 608 (1937).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Suggested changes in the SEC rules
Current rules pertaining to conflicts of interest among corporate directors place
the burden of reporting conflicts on the registrant, the issuer, or the person soliciting
the proxies.5" It may be useful to impose on this reporter the burden of revealing
material interests in corporate transactions of all the directors, officers, nominees
for directors, and owners of 10 per cent of the voting securities, but, for the most
part, this knowledge must come from the individuals concerned. The information
a corporation or the individual soliciting proxies is able to report necessarily de-
pends on the cooperation of those whose transactions he is reporting.
It would seem a better solution to require the interested person himself to make
the disclosure to the corporation, which in turn would put this information in the
regular required reports. Such a requirement would underline the common law
duty of a corporate director to disclose his interests in transactions with his own
company; it would not increase his present legal duties, but it would be an addi-
tional assurance that they will be performed. The threat of criminal punishment
under the Securities Exchange Act would perhaps be more incentive for prompt
disclosure than private remedies to enforce the common law duty.
This suggested provision would make it obligatory for him to make reports
concerning his interests in transactions which are material or part of a series of
transactions which are material 57 in the aggregate. This personal obligation placed
upon a director, officer, or 10 per cent shareholder would resemble current require-
ments under section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act which require an insider to
disclose his own stock purchases and sales.5s
The reports would supplement the common law rules concerning disclosure.
Requiring them monthly would insure that transactions not continue without infor-
mation available to the shareholders indicating director interest. It might be ad-
visable to require copies to be sent to the corporation, the SEC, and the exchange
upon which the stock is listed., 9 No report would be required unless there was a
reportable interest during the month.
A second suggestion is that shareholders be permitted to use the management
proxy statement for the purpose of nominating directors in opposition to the man-
agement's nominees who are personally interested in corporate transactions.6" Such
a provision would resemble the current rule X-14A-8,l which requires corporate
managers to include on their proxy statements a proposal of an issue to be taken
up at the annual meeting.6
This suggestion would require that the proxies solicited by management have
spaces for "yes" and "no" votes for the individual directors, much like a political
ballot. This would only be required when the management slate was opposed; the
shareholder nominee's name would be directly opposite the name of the man he
is to replace.63
56 Securities Exchange Act § 32(a) provides for criminal punishment for one who makes
or causes to be made a false statement, if he cannot show good faith. This would not appear
to apply to one not involved in making the report.
57 Definition, 17 C.F.R. 230.405(2); 17 C.F.R. 210.1-02.
58 Securities Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p).
59 If the stock is not listed, but the SEC expands its jurisdiction to cover corporations
not listed on an exchange, the report to the corporation and the SEC would be sufficient. See
Section IV supra.
60 Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019, Before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1943). See also 37 VA. L. REv. 653 (1951).
61 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8.
62 Rule X-14A-8, supra note 61, appears to indicate that disclosure is not considered to
be enough by the Commission. The stockholder is given an opportunity to voice his opinions
as to matters which are proper for security holders' action. This rule does not presently apply
to the election of officers.
63 If more than one nominee was suggested for a position, the vote of those dissatisfied
with the existing management would be split. It would be better, perhaps, for the incumbent
directors who are unopposed to select the candidate from the persons nominated for each
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A regulation of this type appears to be necessary in view of the fact that the
stockholder's derivative suit does not appear to be an effective means for curing
corporate mismanagement. On the other hand, it has been said that the derivative
suit is an easier way of ousting corrupt managers than is voting them out.64 The
cost of waging a grass-roots proxy fight is usually prohibitive, and, if the person
waging a proxy fight loses, the money spent must come out of his own pocket.65
The cost of this suggestion is not a serious factor; it would require the inclusion
in the proxy statement of very little information not already required by the SEC.
The suggested proxy would have the advantage of placing before the share-
holders at one time the names of both nominees for the directorship, and it would
incorporate within the proxy all the information necessary for the shareholder to
make an intelligent vote. Having the nominees and their qualifications on one
ballot would encourage the stockholder to inform himself before voting, instead of
making a blind, unthinking vote for mismanagementY'°
The apparent reason for current SEC proxy requirements make of proxy
voting something like an old-fashioned shareholders' meeting. The above suggestion
would add to the "meeting" an exchange of ideas and a more direct democratic
election of directors. Under the present rules, proxies can be voted only for persons
named on them; it does no good for a shareholder to stand up at the "meeting"
and nominate his own director, or even to outline corruption in the incumbent
management.67 Most voting is done in the homes of the shareholders before the
annual meetings;6 the individual shareholder, dissatisfied with corporate manage-
ment, has no inexpensive way to oust irresponsible corporate directors.
Conclusion
Although an occasional director enters into transactions with his own com-
pany, transactions motivated by self interest, transactions potentially inequitable
to shareholders, there appears to be no evidence that corruption is widespread or
such that immediate government regulation of all corporate directors is necessary.
The directors of a corporation are elected by its shareholders; their duty is to run
a business for its owners. Separation of ownership and control inevitably invites a
certain looseness; the fundamental reality is that the manager is not dealing with
his own interests. But this looseness is no more than is to be expected in any human
situation involving delegated responsibility - be it agency, trust or political repre-
sentation.
In the ordinary situation, the delegator has control over the delegate and
abundant opportunity for direct, periodical accounting from the delegate. This
is not the case in corporations; since the director is responsible to the corporation,
and not to its owners; shareholder redress for particular misfeasance can be obtained
only indirectly and in the corporate name. The needed reform, perhaps, is one
which will give the owner of the corporation a direct avenue of redress for mis-
management- a device which will leave the shareholder some choice other than
silence or withdrawal.
The owner of a business ought, on the other hand, be free to permit his man-
ager to enter into transactions involving personal profit to the manager. The evil
in these transactions lies not in the personal profit itself, but a lack of communication
between the manager and his employer. It is not for government to decide the
position, to fill the opposing place on the ballot. Admittedly, such a proposition could result
in abuse, but the directors who are entrusted with the management of the whole corporation
are perhaps best qualified to make the selection.
64 Fortune, March, 1954, p. 85.
65 Ibid.
66 See Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control - Securities for Expense Statutes, 63
H-PRv. L. Rav. 476 (1950).
67 See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-4(d).
68 Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors, 39 VA. L. Rav. 141, 159 (1953).
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fairness of a director transaction; it is for the director's employer. But the employer
can hardly be expected to decide the question if he is uninformed.
By its nature, the corporate form invites hidden director transactions never
possible in agency or trust relationships. Shareholders, at least under prevalent cor-
porate theory, supply capital; they do not control their business directly. Govern-
ment action in this area should be directed at strengthening and clarifying owner
control, not at substituting for it bureaucratic control. The regulatory scheme which
will accomplish this with minimum interference in the engines of control is one
which will insure information to the corporate investor.
A system designed to accomplish this should be tightly designed, lest ingenious
management evade it. It should be laid under the present federal agency devoted
to corporate control, the Securities Exchange Commission; this would involve ex-
pansion in the SEC sufficient to insure accurate and complete reporting.
The regulatory scheme should probably go beyond information and insure a
workable and inexpensive method of shareholder redress, and one which will not
hinder the director in dutifully performing his necessary function. A system of re-
porting under government compulsion, coupled with the present derivative remedy,
would seem sufficient to protect the shareholder with an honest claim, while dis-
couraging capricious lawsuits. Shareholder nominations on the management proxy
will assist in the removal of dishonest directors and will provide an avenue of redress
neither as expensive nor as risky as the derivative action.
If the director is compelled to make public his private transactions, and if the
shareholder is given a swift and workable remedy for abuse, it is not likely that
corporate management will extend its activity beyond that which is above reproach.
Thomas J. Kelly
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW BY REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES
Introduction
The legal profession in England was granted an exclusive right to the practice
of law when, in 1292, Edward I "directed his justices to provide for every county
a sufficient number of attorneys and apprentices from among the best, the most
lawful and the most teachable so that king and people might be well served."1
The order is a landmark in English law as it expressly charged the justices with
the duty of regulating the legal profession, a power which has been carefully
guarded over the centuries by the judiciary, although in later years this pro-
tection has been partly shared with the legislature.2 This "monopoly" gains its value
today not because of historical significance, but rather due to the concept of pro-
tection of the public from unqualified or unreliable practitioners.3 The lawyer is
1 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 216 (2d ed. 1952). (Em-
phasis added.) In 1402 Parliament passed a statute which again provided that all attorneys
should be examined by the justices. 4 Hen. 4 (1402) c. 18. Later, another statute was
passed which limited admission to practice to those educated in the Inns of Court. 3 Jac.
1 (1605) c. 7. From this beginning, the concept of the lawyer being an "officer of the
court" was developed, a term less literally accurate today. See Voa Baur, An Historical
Sketch of the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 24 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS No. 3,
p. 1 (1958); Chroust, The Lawyer of the Middle Ages, 31 NOTRE DAME LAwYER, 537, 571,
591 (1956).
2 See, e.g., Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n. of Arkansas, 326 S.W.2d 900,
902 (Ark. 1959) (power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of
the judicial department); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126, 128-29 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) (legislative acts on the practice of law are merely in the aid of the judiciary
and not to the exclusion thereof).
3 In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass.
176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943). See 56 A.B.A. REP. 470-77 (1931); Davis, Unauthorized
Practice of Law and the Public Interest in the Qualified Lawyer, 21 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
NEws No. 4, p. 4, (1955).
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a highly trained individual, a member of one of the three learned professions,
and bound by a very high code of ethics which the courts have zealously en-
forced.4
The protest against the practice of law by real estate agents and title in-
surance companies is not based merely on the monopoly rights of the bar, but
also on the fact that such organizations are not the impartial parties that lawyers
are.5 The danger is not necessarily that the officer of the title insurance company
or the real estate broker will give incompetent legal service, but that they will
give misleading and even dishonest advice so as to rush the sale to completion.6
This tendency is most apparent in states like Colorado, which by statute pro-
vides that the real estate broker has not earned his commission until the sale is
consummated.7 The title company officer also is under the pressure of losing the
fee for the company if the sale falls through, and especially so if he knows a broker's
commission depends upon the closing of the deal. Furthermore, neither real estate
brokers nor title insurance companies are subject to the strict sanctions of the bar
and the courts for imprudent conduct violative of the lawyer's canons of ethics.s
This conflict between the bar and the various lay groups, such as real estate
brokers and title insurance companies, has been a hard one to fight primarily due
to the difficulty in drawing precise areas which could definitely be said to be the
province of the bar or the lay group.9 The dividing line is shadowy at best, and,
as the following discussion shows, is not capable of precise definition which will
fit all 'areas of conflict. This note is not intended to espouse the cause either of
the lawyer or of the real estate agent and title insurance company; it is an at-
tempt to show what line has been drawn as to the practice of law in relation
to these organizations. For this purpose, a logical and systematic examination of
the more important cases in the field is attempted, primarily in light of the de-
fenses which the lay organizations have interposed. This area of the law is far
from being subject to definite rules. Rather, it evinces a case-by-case approach
by the courts, on the basis of individual facts and circumstances, to strike an
accord which will best serve the public in its relations with these organizations.
4 In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928) (Canons of Professional Ethics
of American Bar Association specifically enforced). To attempt to refute the public policy
behind the lawyers' "monopoly" by pointing out instances of "sloppy" practice or dishonesty
serves merely to indicate that perhaps the guiding lines of the "monopoly" are not quite
strict enough.
5 Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of
the Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoa. 66, 70-71 (1938). For an excellent discussion of this point,
see the brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, pp. 136-46, State Bar of
Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co. (Sup. Ct. Ariz. No. 6724) (not yet decided) on
file in the Notre Dame Law School Library.
6 The courts are in clear disagreement as to whether much litigation results from al-
lowing title companies and brokers to perform various legal services. Compare Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Wash. Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952)
("constant stream of litigation arising from this source"), with Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn.
642, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) ("rare instances of defective conveyances"). The simplicity
of modem form conveyancing militates against the possibility of defective instruments. The
greater danger is the possibility of "prejudicial advice" by the broker or title company at
the time of execution of the instruments.
7 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 117-2-1 (1953). Most states hold that "in the absence of
express agreement, the broker earns his commission if he is the effective cause of producing
a customer willing and able to buy on terms acceptable to the owner." CASNER & LEACH,
CASES & TExT ON PROPERTY 619 (1951). But see Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855, 861 (1952). The court pointed out that the broker has a definite interest in the trans-
action right up until jit is closed, for it is only at this time that he actually receives his
commission.
8 "Protection of the public is set at naught if laymen who are not subject to court
supervision are permitted to practice law." Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d
788, 795 (1951); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
9 See Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940).
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I. PRACTICE OF LAW
The dividing line between the work of lawyers and various lay organizations
is often drawn by the deceptively simple question: Does it constitute the practice
of law?"0 Most courts have been reluctant to admit there is any one definition
of the practice of law;" at best they usually define it in broad generalities. 2 The
courts do agree, however, that the practice of law is not limited to the court-
room, but includes advice and counsel and the preparation of legal documents.'
Few legislatures have attempted to define comprehensively the practice of law,' 4
which is undoubtedly due to the court's position that such definition is merely in aid
of their jurisdiction of the practice of law and not determinative of it.'i The cases
indicate that such a priori generalizations, whether by the courts or the legislature,
are little help in settling each controversy.
Corporations are prohibited from practicing law because to permit a corpora-
tion to make a "merchant's profit" on the work of its hired lawyers would destroy
that relation of trust and confidence which exists between a client and his attorney,
by putting the attorney in a position of divided loyalty.16 A corporation may, of
course, hire salaried lawyers to do its own legal work when the corporation is
not acting in a representative capacity.' 7 In cases where title insurance companies
(usually corporations) are permitted to continue preparing legal instruments as
an incident of their businesses, it would seem that, in reality, this is a corporation
practicing law; but most courts which have considered the question say it is not.""
Realtors, those real estate brokers and select real estate salesmen who are
members of constituent boards of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, 9
subscribe to a Code of Ethics which prohibits them from practicing law.2 0 Ac-
cording to the realtors, this means that they may fill out forms regularly used
in the course of their business, but may not draw instruments not related to the
conduct of a real estate transaction.21 The American Title Association, in its Code
of Ethics, has no similar provision. 22
10 Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 80 A.B.A.
REP. 168, 169 (1955).
11 "We believe it is impossible to frame any comprehensive definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. Each case must be decided upon its own particular facts." Arkansas
Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (Ark 1959); Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Wash. Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952).
12 Fink v. Peden, 214 Ind. 584, 17 N.E.2d 95 (1938) (doing the work of an attorney);
People ex rel. Ill. Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901
(1931) (practice of law consists of advice or service which requires any degree of legal skill
or knowledge).
13 Practice of law "includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal in-
struments . . . by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be
pending in a court." Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837-38 (1893). For
cases approving this definition see Annot., 151 A.L.R. 781 (1944).
14 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-401 (Supp. 1958); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-302 (1955).
15 See cases cited note 2, Supra.
16 E.g., Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 596, 179 S.W.2d
946 (1944); Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
17 Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 596, 179 S.W.2d 946
(1944).
18 See Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954); La Brun v.
Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948). Contra, Bar Ass'n of Tenn.
v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (although the
company was found to be practicing law, it was not enjoined on grounds of public policy).
19 There are approximately 67,000 active realtors out of approximately 500,000 people
directly involved in the selling of real estate. Letter from the National Association of Real
Estate Boards to the NOTRE DAME LAwYER, on file in the Notre Dame Law School Library.
20 Article 7 of the Realtor's Code of Ethics.
21 Conser, Commentaries on the Code of Ethics (National Association of Real Estate
Boards) 9 (1959).
22 See American Title Association, Code of Ethics, 37 TITLE NEws No. 1, p. 24 (1958).
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II. INCIDENT-To-BUSINESS THEORY
The controversy over the practice of law by the real estate broker and the
tide insurance company centers around their right to prepare legal instruments
in their business, instruments which transfer or affect the title to an interest in
realty. Both the brokers and the tide insurance companies declare that they have
the right, in the absence of statute, to fill out legal documents for use in their
businesses. The brokers claim that, as an incident of their selling function, they
have a right to prepare instruments which both bind the parties in the first in-
stance,-as in a .simple contract of sale, and effect the final transfer of title. The
brokers advance several reasons for this, but primarily they state that public policy
is in favor of allowing such practices,23 and secondly, that they cannot be ex-
pected to have an attorney with them at all times.24 Title companies use this same
basic argument; they claim they have the right to draw all the necessary legal
papers, including deeds, mortgages, releases, liens, and other instruments, neces-
sary to perfect the tide which they intend to insure.
25
A. Theory Accepted
Many. courts have recognized the incident-to-business theory, provided there
is no separate charge for instrument preparation, and hold that a person is not
practicing law when he merely fills in simple blank forms, requiring no more legal
ability than that possessed by the average man who deals in such matters.26 In
Cain v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co., 2 for example, the court was called
upon to enjoin a trust company from preparing mortgages, bills of sale, and crop
contracts which involved settlements in which the bank was interested. The court
refused to grant an injunction, stating:
[A] person who is not a member of the bar may draw instruments such
as simple deeds, mortgages, promissory notes, and bills of sale when these
instruments are incident to transactions in which such person is interested,
provided no charge is made therefor. . . . The draw[er] of complicated
legal instruments . . . practices law even though such instruments might,
to some extent, be incident to a business.
2 8
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in La Brum v. Commonwealth Title
Co.,29 upheld the right of a title company to prepare, for compensation, legal in-
struments used in the company's business. After holding that the company had
the right to examine instruments in the transfer of title and. require corrections
before it issued an insurance policy, the court said:
Drawing the instrument correctly in the first place is no more unau-
23 See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d
998 (1957).
24 To require an attorney to be at the beck and call of the broker whenever a sale
was to be made would result in unnecessary expense, and possibly would make attorneys
become real estate brokers in order to legally close a contract for the sale of real estate.
Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713, 721 (1955).
25 See La Brun v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
26 Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713
(1955) (conveyancing as an incident to the broker's business permitted); Cooperman v.
West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954) (title company permitted standard form
conveyancing to arrive at insurable title); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855
(1952) (form instruments may be prepared by real estate broker acting as a broker); La
Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); Cowern v. Nelson,
207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (public convenience necessitates that brokers have
the right to prepare legal instruments incidental to transactions in which they are acting);
Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936); Childs v.
Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883, 885 (1934) (involved a public stenographer but contains
dictum as to real estate brokers); People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125
N.E. 666, 670 (1919) (concurring opinion), where Judge Pound stated: "The preparation
of the legal papers may be ancillary to the daily business of the actor or it may be the
business itself."
27 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936).
28 Id. at 723.
29 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
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thorized practice of law than examining or approving it after it has been
drawn, or returning it for correction after it has been found to have been
erroneously drawn.3 0
The La Brum case failed to consider the effect of legal advice given by the title
company or even to comment on the fact that separate compensation was charged
for the drafting of the legal instruments. The language used by the court re-
flects a liberal view towards what is not the practice of law, for the court went
so far as to say that public conveyancing was permissible.3' The only other case
involving a title company which has specifically relied on and upheld the incidental
theory is Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co. 32 The court there held that title
companies had the right, in the absence of compensation, to prepare necessary legal
instruments.
[What the companies do] to accomplish a transfer of a title or inter-
est of such kind that a policy of title insurance is warranted are not
services the performance of which amount to unauthorized practice of
law.33
The companies were forbidden to render legal advice and escrow services where
they were not insuring the title, but the court did not consider the question of
legal advice to insurance customers.
The theory, as applied to real estate brokers, was well stated in another
Pennsylvania case, Childs v. Smeltzer,3 4 which involved a public stenographer. The
court in recognition of the briefs filed by several real estate boards stated:
There can be no objection to the preparation of deeds and mortgages
or other contracts by such brokers so long as the papers involved pertain
to and grow out of their business transactions and are intimately con-
nected therewith. The drafting and execution. of legal instruments is a
necessary concomitant of many businesses, and cannot be considered un-
lawful. Such practice only falls within the prohibition of the act when the
documents are drawn in relation to matters in no manner connected
with the immediate business of the person preparing them .... 35
Again the Pennsylvania court failed to consider the problems of legal advice and
separate compensation for the preparation of such instruments.
The Missouri case of Hulse v. Criger" embodies the modern approach to the
problem of unauthorized practice of law by the real estate broker via acceptance
of the incident-to-business doctrine. The court there held: (1) A real estate
broker, in transactions where he is acting as a broker, may fill out standardized
forms of contracts, warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, trust deeds, notes, chattel
mortgages and short-term leases, provided the forms were originally drawn or
approved by counsel, but the broker may not create certain types of compli-
cated estates; (2) A real estate broker may neither charge for such services, nor
render them at all when he is not acting as a broker in the transaction; and
(3) even in transactions where the real estate broker is acting as a broker, he
may not give legal advice to the parties. 37 The case completely covers most
areas of broker-lawyer conflict and sets up certain workable and definite standards,
more so than do most cases in the field. A subsequent case, Ingham County Bar
Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co.,38 a very thorough opinion, followed the reasoning of
Hulse after an examination of most cases in the field. The court in the Ingham
case refused to stop real estate brokers from preparing legal instruments, and
due to public policy considerations stemming from the customary handling of real
30 Id. at 248.
31 Id. at 249.
32 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
33 Id. at 821.
34 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934).
35 Id. at 885.
36 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952).
37 Id. at 862.
38 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955).
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estate transactions in the state, it termed the plaintiff's claims "unrealistic and
impractical."3 9
B. Theory Substantially Modified
Several courts in cases involving real estate brokers have accepted the in-
cident-to-business theory, but have limited its application to the initial contract
of sale or an offer or acceptance4 0 In Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n,4'
the real estate broker was limited in the drawing of legal instruments "to those,
such as a memorandum, deposit receipt, or the contract, as the case may be,
recording his handiwork - that is the bringing together of buyer and seller.' ' 42
A recent case, Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block,43 has gone even further and
forbidden the real estate broker from preparing not only all types of deeds, op-
tions, easements, notes, leases, mortgages, releases, and legal notices, but also con-
tracts for the sale of realty and loan applications, regardless of whether such
instruments are prepared incidental to a brokerage transaction. The reasoning
of the court was based on the idea that the practice of law, though difficult to
define, included conveyancing, and since the real estate firms were either not
licensed to practice law, or corporations which could not be licensed, they were
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.44 However, simple offers and ac-
ceptances- were excluded because they contemplate the subsequent preparation of
a deed to the property involved, and possible other related instruments, which
only a lawyer is competent to prepare.45 Contracts and agreements for the sale
of real estate obviously contemplate the same instruments, and loan applications
also contemplate further mortgage papers, but the court felt that the public in-
terest would best be served if these instruments were all drawn by lawyers.
C. Theory Rejected
The incident-to-business theory, as applied to title insurance companies, has
often been rejected, 46 but as applied to real estate brokers no court has both
completely rejected the theory and also enjoined the practice.47 The landmark
case, which rejected the incident-to-business theory, is Hexter Title & Abstract
Co. v. Grievance Comm.4 8 An injunction was sought against the title company to
39. Id. at 721.
40 Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (Ark. 1959);
Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950); Commonwealth v. Jones
& Robins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947); cf. People ex rel. Ill. Bar Ass'n v. Schafer,
404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949), noted at 25 NOTRB DAME LAW'YER 387 (1950); Gustafson
v. V. 0. Taylor & Sons, 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941) (only legal instruments
being drawn were simple contracts for the sale of realty).
41 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950).
42 Id. at 606. This reasoning was refuted in Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855, 861 (1952), where the court pointed out that the broker has a definite interest in the
transaction right up until it is closed, for it is only at this time that he actually receives his
commission. "Thus he is personally concerned in the transaction and actually he is acting
partly in his own interest in getting a contract signed and the deal dosed."
43 323 S.W.2d 912, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (Ark. 1959).
44 Id. at 915.
45 Id. at 916.
46 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N..J. 430, 161
A.2d 257 (1960); Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Ark., 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.
1959); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958);
Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957); Steer v. Land
Title Guar. & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C.P. 1953); Hexter Title & Abstract Co.
v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); People v. Lawyers Title Corp.,
282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1930).
47 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P.2d 998 (1957), where the court held that drafting of incidental legal papers and giving
legal advice constituted the practice of law, but the real estate brokers were not enjoined from
such practices because of public policy.
48 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
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prevent its staff attorneys from drawing deeds, notes, mortgages, deeds of trust,
mechanic liens, releases, and curing defects in titles which it insured but had no
direct interest in as a party thereto. Such instruments were drawn in conjunc-
tion with the sale by the company of title insurance, and no separate charge was
made for the instruments. The Supreme Court of Texas took an adamant stand
against such practices, stating:
The work of preparing these papers is distinct from the searching and
insuring of the title - the legitimate business for which the corporation
is incorporated. It is not the business of the title insurance company to
create a good title in an applicant for insurance by preparing the neces-
sary conveyances, nor to cure defects in an existing title . . . merely for
the purpose of putting the title in condition to be insured .... It may
examine the title, point out the defects, and specify the requirements
necessary to meet its demands, but it is the business of the applicant for
the insurance to cure the defects. 49
The court then went on to point out what would be the effect if corporations
and lay agencies were allowed to use legal services as an inducement to pur-
chase the primary service offered:
Ultimately most legal work, other than the trial of cases in the court-
house, could be performed by corporations and others not licensed to prac-
tice law. The law practice would be hawked about as a leader or premium
to be given as an inducement for business transactions.5 0
An attempt to get around the result in the Hexter decision by an affiliated
law firm was struck down by the Texas court in Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance
Comm. 1 Similarly, the courts have disapproved of situations where lawyers have
sought to "feed" their law business through wholly-owned real estate firms.5 2
The danger here is the conflicting interests which the attorney represents, plus
the ability of the allied business to advertise the services of the lawyer, some-
thing the lawyer cannot do for himself.
53
Within the last few years, important decisions concerning title companies
have been rendered in Colorado,54 Nevada,55 Arkansas,5 6 and New Jersey,57 which
have followed the Hexter case in rejecting the incident-to-business theory. In the
Colorado case the court held that conveyancing was neither necessary nor in-
cidental to insuring titles, and the title companies were enjoined from such prac-
tices except where they were direct parties to the transaction. 8 The title com-
panies had relied heavily on a statute, which, upon a literal interpretation, granted
to them "the power and right to make, execute and perfect" title to real estate.5 9
The court rejected this reading and said that an interpretation of the statute to
permit such activities would render it unconstitutional as authorizing corpora-
tions to practice law.
In the Nevada case, Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar,60 the title
company, in connection with escrow services it offered to purchasers of title in-
surance, prepared purchase and sale agreements, deeds, notes, chattel mortgages,
49 Id. at 952.
50 Id. at 953.
51 272 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
52 Hines v. Donovan, 101 N.H. 239, 139 A.2d 884 (1958) (attorney-real estate broker
serving as both for client); In re L.R., 7 N.J. 390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951) (realty corporation
owned by attorney offered a one-package system).
53 Affiliated businesses are violative of Canon 6 (adverse influences and conflicting in-
terests) and Canon 27 (advertising, direct or indirect) of the Canons of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association.
54 Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957).
55 Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958).
56 Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Ark., 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1959).
57 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161
A.2d 257 (1960).
58 Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957).
59 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-11-7(1) (1953).
60 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958).
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trust deeds, assignments, escrow agreements and instructions, and bills of sale, which
were checked by the company attorney for legal sufficiency. The court did not
object to the company's clerical preparation of such instruments or to its com-
petency, but it was concerned with the company's exercise of judgment, through.
its own attorney, of the legal sufficiency of the instruments. Such action con-
stituted unauthorized practice of law, and the company was enjoined from exe-
cuting any of the above legal instruments, except purchase and sale agreements
and escrow agreements and instructions. An exception to this rule could be made
where the public interest by reason of practical necessity -required it, either due
to a paucity of lawyers, or where
the incidental legal services are necessary to the providing of what is
essentially lay counselling. It should not be enough that certain legal serv-
ices can be said to be incidental or reasonably connected. It is not the
public convenience in the providing of those legal services with which
we are concerned in such a case. Rather ,it is that the lay services can
continue to be effectively given in the public interest. 61
The court in Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Ark.,62 in re-
liance upon the Pioneer decision, completely rejected the idea that conveyancing
and curing of title defects was legitimately incidental to the sale of title insurance.
The opinion stressed the fact that the public interest required that, in securing
professional advice upon legal rights, one is entitled to absolute competency and
integrity, which only a lawyer, with his undivided allegiance, can provide.
The most recent case espousing this view is State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
Title Co.,63 where the court found three instances of unauthorized practice of
law: (1) The drawing of bonds, mortgages, and mortgagors affidavits of title
in transactions wherein the company itself was the mortgagee was enjoined as
the practice of law, because the fees paid to the company for search and title
abstracting were far in excess of the cost to the title company, and could be
fairly interpreted as a separate charge for such services. (2) Filling in blanks in
bond and mortgage forms in transactions where the company was acting for other
lending agencies was also enjoined, as well as clearing of objections to titles the
company insilred.
D. Theory Rejected But Activity Not Enjoined
One Colorado case, Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n 6 4
was unusual because, not only did it completely reject the incident-to-business
theory as applied to real estate brokers, but it also refused to enjoin such activity
due to public policy considerations. In refusing to enjoin the real estate brokers
from preparing contracts for the sale of realty, deeds, deeds of trust and re-
leases, and giving advice as to the legal efficacy of such instruments the court
said:
We feel that to grant the injunctive relief requested, thereby denying to
the public the right to conduct real estate transactions in the manner
in which they have been transacted for over half a century, with apparent
satisfaction, and requiring all such transactions to be conducted through
lawyers, would not be in the public inXerest; that the advantages, if any,
to be derived by such limitations are outweighed by the convenience
now enjoyed by the public in being permitted to choose either their bro-
ker or their lawyer to do the acts or render the services which the plain-
tiffs seek to enjoin.65
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in a case involving a title company, recently
held that public policy required the court to hold that similar practices, while
partially constituting the practice of law, were all legitimately inherent in the
61 Id. at 412.
62 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1959).
63 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960).
64 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957).
65 Id. at 1007.
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principle business of the company, and consequently should not be enjoined as
the practice of law.
66
III. SIMPLE VERSUS COMPLEX
It is often advanced in these cases that the mere clerical filling out of
standardized forms or drawing instruments of a generally recognized, stereotyped
form, which affect or convey an interest in realty, is not the unauthorized practice
of law.6 7 But, if the instrument is to be shaped from a mass of facts and con-
ditions, which must be sorted and examined, it is not a simple instrument and
the drafting of such can be enjoined.6 8 The theory received its most significant
application in New York, in People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 69 where the
court refused to enjoin a corporation which was, without giving legal advice,
filling in blanks in bills of sale and chattel mortgages for its customers. In an-
other decision, rendered the same day, the Court of Appeals limited this doctrine
to those instruments drawn as an incident of the primary business.7 The Title
Guarantee case also contains the strongest support in opposition to the theory,
for in a concurring opinion Judge Pound accepted the incident-to-business theory
and rejected the majority reasoning saying in an oft-quoted passage: "I am un-
able to rest any satisfactory test on the distinction between simple and complex
instruments. The most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often
trouble the inexperienced." 7' Subsequently the test was repudiated by New York1
2
The theory is far from being dead or academic, for it is implicit as a lim-
itation on the incident-to-business doctrine in many of the decisions presently being
rendered.73
IV. COMPENSATION
Another ancillary defense, often used with the incident-to-business theory, is
the absence of separate compensation.7 4 The payment of separate compensation
for the preparation of even incidental legal instruments constitutes unauthorized
practice of law. 5 In one case, where a statute allowed real estate brokers to
charge for incidental drafting of legal instruments, this provision was struck down
66 Bar Ass'n of Tenn. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1959).
67 See Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 788 (1957); Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments:
The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 LAW & CONTEM,. PROB. 66 (1938); Nelson,
Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem From the Standpoint of the Realtors, 5
LAW & CONTEMP. PRo. 57 (1938).
68 In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Ida. 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930).
69 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919). Accord, Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855 (1952); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); In re Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co., 49 Ida. 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930). Contra, Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958) (the exercise of judgement, not the sim-
plicity or complexity of the service, distinguishes the practice of law); People ex rel. Ill.
State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949), noted at 25 NOTRE DMSE
LAWYER 387 (1950); People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940).
70 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
71 People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919)
(concurring opinion).
72 People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940).
73 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398,
312 P.2d 998 (1957) (any common form instrument used in realty business); Cooperman
v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954) (standard form conveyancing).
74 The compensation test has been accepted by the courts as a limitation on the incident-
to-business theory; e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398,
312 P.2d 998 (1957); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
Contra, La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948) (separate
compensation permitted) (minority decision).
75 Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); Commonwealth v. Jones &
Robins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
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by the court.76 However, statutes which base their test of unauthorized practice
of law on whether compensation was charged have not been favorably received
by the courts.
7 7
Some courts in cases concerning title companies have held that the con-
sideration does not even have to be a separate charge, but can be inherent in
a premium rate charged by the insurer.7 8 In Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v.
Grievance Comm. 97 the court adeptly perceived that the drafting of legal in-
struments was an inducement to employ the title company to insure the title.
Furthermore:
The furnishing of such legal services constitutes a part of the cost of
obtaining the business transacted by the defendant. Evidently it pays, or
the practice would be discontinued .... There is therefore 'a considera-
tion, reward, or pecuniary benefit' flowing to the defendant for the
legal services so rendered.80
In a recent case which followed this view the court was impressed with the
fact that, although no listed charge was made for the incidental drafting of legal
papers, a deduction or refund was made to insurers who provided their own
attorney for such functions.8' And in State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Title Co., S2
this concept of indirect compensation was extended to include certain legal papers
to which the company was a party.
V. PUBLIC POLICY
Since the unauthorized practice of law is said to be an evil, not because
it takes business from the lawyer, but because it endangers the personal and
property rights of the public, it is important in these cases for the courts to
reach a decision which will best serve the public.83 This was found by the courts
to be one of the primary factors in deciding several recent cases. 4 Notable among
these was Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,85 where the facts
showed that to enjoin the practices complained of (preparing of contracts, deeds,
deeds of trust and releases, and giving legal advice) would be more harmful than
beneficial, for in 20 counties in the state there were only 24 lawyers.80 Such
transactions were often consummated at times when lawyers were not customarily
available - evenings, Sundays, and holidays. Furthermore, the court was re-
luctant to grant an injunction which would change the manner in which the
public had been handling their real estate transactions for over a half century.8 7
One court found a state statute to be determinative of public policy,88 while
another partially relied upon the statement of principles agreed on between the
American Bar Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards 9
76 Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
77 See Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Wash. Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251
P.2d 619 (1952).
78 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern NJ. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430,
161 A.2d 257 (1960); Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Ark., 326 S.W.2d 900(Ark. 1959); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v.
Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
79 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
80 Id. at 952.
81 Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Ark., 326 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ark. 1959).
82 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257, 264-65 (1960).
83 56 A.B.A. REP. 470-77 (1931). E.g., Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52
N.E.2d 27 (1943).
84 Bar Ass'n of Tenn. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1959); Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d
998 (1957); Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d
713 (1955); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
85 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957).
86 Id. at 1001.
87 Id. at 1007.
88 Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
89 The statement is set out in 3 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 128A (1961).
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as recognition of the public interest in allowing preparation of incidental legal
instruments. 0
In most cases, the public policy argument has not been accepted with so
much vigor as in the Conway-Bogue case. But its effect can be seen in all unau-
thorized practice of law cases, because the judges alone define practice of law,
and even legislative enactments are merely in aid of this jurisdiction. Thus, the
judges have had to turn - at least impliedly - to public policy, to help them
in their definition of the practice of law.
VI. STATUTORY REGULATION
Several states have enacted statutes which give real estate brokers and title
insurance companies the right to draft legal instruments.91 The courts have gen-
erally refused to approve these exceptions as to title companies, since the com-
panies are mostly corporations and as such may not practice law.9 2 The courts
are able to do this because legislative acts relating to the legal profession have
no binding effect on the court's inherent power to regulate and define the practice
of law.93 But, as for real estate brokers, the exceptions have been approved; one
case so held, reasoning that the statute represented public policy.94 However, the
unfavorable attitude of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State Bar Ass'n v.
Northern N.J. Title Co.' s towards title companies indicates that the state's statutory
exception in favor of real estate brokers may in the future be overruled by the
court.
The Texas legislature, drawing upon the inducement or incidental pecuniary
benefit concept in the Hexter case, enacted in 1949 an amendment to its Real Estate
License Act, which provides:
Any license granted under the provisions of this Act shall be can-
celled . . . upon proof that the licensee, not being licensed and au-
thorized to practice law in this State, for a consideration, reward,
pecuniary benefit, present or anticipated, direct or indirect, or in con-
nection with or as a part of his employment, agency, or fiduciary rela-
tions, as licensee, draws any deed, note, deed of trust, or will, or any
other written instrument, that may transfer or anywise affect the title
or interest in land, or advises or counsels any person as to the validity
or legal sufficiency of any such instrument above mentioned, or as to the
validity of title of real estate. 99
A literal interpretation of the statute would indicate that real estate brokers are
prohibited from even filling in blanks of earnest money contract forms, although
they would have the right to prepare offers and acceptances. However, it is
doubtful that such an interpretation would be imposed on the brokers, due to
the court's right to define the practice of law, and the almost unanimous recog-
nition by the courts of the convenience and necessity of brokers preparing such
preliminary instruments. No other state has by statute attempted to go this far
90 Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952).
91 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-11-7(1) (1953) (title companies); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-401 (Supp. 1958) (title companies); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02, subd. 3 (1958)
(specifically excepts real estate brokers, but title companies may also be excepted under cer-
tain conditions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-81 (1953) (title insurance companies and real
estate brokers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 212.02 (1957) (title companies).
92 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161
A.2d 257 (1960) ; Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957) ;
cf. Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). The
insurance commission rate schedule, which provided for fees for drawing the legal papers in-
cident to a sale of title insurance, was held not to authorize practice of law by the title com-
panies. Contra, La Bruin v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
93 See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126, 128-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
94 Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (statute as modified by the
court, was accepted as being a declaration of public policy); Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L.
46, 172 At. 63 (1934).
95 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960).
96 Tx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 17 (1960).
in prohibiting the preparation of incidental legal instruments by the broker.
Mississippi, under its real estate licensing law, prohibits the broker from acting
as a general conveyancer, although he may use earnest money contracts, "as well
as any other standard legal form used by the broker in transacting such busi-
ness," provided they are approved by the local bar association and real estate
board. 7 The statute is based on the statement of principles entered into between
the American Bar Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards,98
and like the statement itself, is unclear as to exactly what instruments the bro-
ker may draw. Most states provide that "improper conduct," which undoubtedly
would include unauthorized practice of law, will subject the broker to loss or
suspension of his license.9
Almost all states have general prohibitory language to the effect that draw-
ing legal instruments by one not licensed to practice law is unauthorized. 00 Most
states do not specifically prohibit title insurance companies from practicing law,
although they generally have express statutory prohibitions against corporations
practicing law. 10' On the other hand, some states have enumerated the powers
of title insurance companies; conspicuously absent from these is the right to pre-
pare incidental legal instruments'
0 2
Recently a model act providing procedures to aid in halting unauthorized
practice of law has been promulgated by the National Conference of Comis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.10 3 The act states that the attorney-general of
the state may, upon his own information or a complaint being filed with him,
bring an injunctive action against unauthorized practioners, and any organized
bar in the state may intervene. 0 4 In states, such as Maryland, which prohibit
professional associations from conducting litigation which concerns the interests
of its members, this law would be of great value.'10
VII. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
The American Bar Association has formulated statements of principles with
several lay organizations, including the National Association of Real Estate Boards,
which was achieved by a joint conference of realtors and lawyers in 1942.106
Article I, which is the heart of the agreement, provides:
1. The Realtor shall not practice law or give legal advice di-
rectly or indirectly; he shall not act as a public conveyancer, nor give
(legal) advice or opinions ... and he shall not .. discourage...
employing the services of a lawyer.
2. The Realtor shall not undertake to draw or prepare documents
fixing aned defining the legal rights of parties to a transaction. How-
ever, when acting as broker, a Realtor may use an earnest money con-
tract form for the protection of either party against unreasonable with-
drawal from the transaction, provided that such earnest money contract
form, as well as any other standard legal forms used by the broker in
transacting such business, shall first have been approved and promulgated
97 MIsS. CODE ANN. § 8920-11 (1957).
98 The statement is set out in 3 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 128A (1961).
99 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-6(a)(10) (1958); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 136.08(2)(k) (1957);
cf. Mcn. STAT. ANN. § 19.803(j) (1959) (unfair dealing).
100 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (1958).
101 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-402 (1933); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 221, § 46 (1955);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1958).
102 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1735 (1954); N.Y. INs. LAw § 432 (1949).
103 MODEL ACT PROVIDING REMEDIES FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
104 Id. at § I.
105 Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County v. Dist. Title Ins. Co., 29 U.S.L. WEEK 2085 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Aug. 30, 1960).
106 The statement is set out in 3 MARTINDALE-HUBBEBLL LAW DIRECTORY 128A (1961).
The statement is also termed the "Memphis Agreement." Statements have also been formu-
lated with accountants, trust institutions, collection agencies, insurance adjusters, life in-
surance underwriters, and publishers. 3 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 123A (1961).
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for such use by the Bar Association and the Real Estate Board in the
locality where the forms are to be used.
3. The Realtor shall not participate in the lawyer's fees.'0 7
Article II of the agreement seeks to limit the role of lawyers in real estate trans-
actions, while Article III provides for continued working together by the two
organizations' 05
Previous to the formulation of the statement, lawyers had claimed that real
estate brokers could neither draft nor select instruments that affected a right or
title to realty, unless the broker was a direct party to the transaction. 10 9 Brokers, on
the other hand, had claimed that they could prepare all legal instruments incidental
to their business and render legal advice on them." 0 Thus, the statement was a
needed policy delimitation. However, its use by the courts has been quite limited, for
only one case has taken judicial notice of the statement."' The court there held that
the broker could prepare the contract for the sale of realty and also other legal forms,
such as warranty deeds and trust deeds, where a standardized legal form was used
which had been originally approved or drawn by counsel.
The only legal instrument specifically mentioned in the statement is an "earnest
money contract form," but the provision for "other standard legal forms" can be
interpreted to mean that the broker may prepare all the necessary instnments to
consummate the transaction he has procured. 1 2 However, a prerequisite of this
right is that the forms be approved by both the local bar association and real estate
board. The American Bar Association presently claims that, to its knowledge, this
has not been done anywhere and hence that real estate brokers do not have the
right to prepare any instruments relating to the legal rights of parties to a trans-
action." 3 Both the American Bar Association and the National Association of Real
Estate Boards have sought to establish local joint conference groups, but the result
has so far been sporadic." 4 Although agreements such as this are helpful when
followed by both sides, they are not binding upon the courts or the parties." 5
Conclusion
The reasons for judicial favor for real estate brokers, over title insurance com-
panies, in regard to what constitutes unauthorized practice of law, are twofold:
First, title companies are usually corporations, and, as such, cannot practice law;
this has made it easier for the courts to declare their legal services unauthorized.
Second, public policy is on the side of the real estate broker, for in most states the
brokers can lay claim to a long-standing practice of drafting simple form instru-
ments, fostered by public convenience and even necessity. In only three states,
107 Id. at 128A. (Emphasis added.)
108 Id. at 129A.
109 The Lawyer and the Real Estate Broker, 26 A.B.A.J. 340 (1940). See 62 A.B.A. REP.
769, 778 (1937); 61 A.B.A. REP. 704, 710 (1936).
110 See Nelson, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of
the Realtors, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 59 (1938).
111 Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952).
112 This was the view taken by the House of Delegates at the 1943 meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. See 68 A.B.A. REP. 132-41 (1943). Contra, Chace & Daniel, Real Estate
Brokers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 4 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 285, 300 (1951). The
authors there said that the statement contemplates acts that "fall short of a conveyance or
final disposition of a particular transaction."
113 Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 33, State Bar of Ariz. v.
Arizona Land Title & Trust Co. (Sup. Ct. Ariz. No. 6724) (not yet decided) on file in the
Notre Dame Law School Library. However, the National Association of Real Estate Boards
cites several instances of mutual agreement on form instruments. See letter from National
Association of Real Estate Boards to NOTRE DAME LAWYER on file in the Notre Dame Law
School Library.
114 See 1952 REPORT, JOINT CONFERENCE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ORGANIZING A LOCAL
CONFERENCE GROUP OF A REAL ESTATE BOARD AND BAR ASSOCIATION, on file in the Notre
Dame Law School Library.
115 People v. Denver Clearing House Banks, 99 Colo. 50, 59 P.2d 468 (1936).
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Florida,nO Virginia117 and Arkansas,1 s have the courts definitely forbidden the real
estate broker to consummate the transaction he has arranged. On the other hand,
in only three states have title insurance companies been expressly granted this
right by the courts. 11"9 Although states may enact legislation granting or with-
holding this right to prepare incidental legal instruments, the final arbiter of what
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law is the court.
What constitutes unauthorized practice of law for real estate brokers and title
insurance companies cannot be set down in one rule, rather it must be attacked on
a case-by-case basis, with primary emphasis on the public interest. However, by
reason of practical necessity it can unequivocably be stated that real estate brokers
have the right to at least prepare a simple earnest money contract to bind parties
they have brought together, provided there is no separate charge for such service.
Although this instrument defines the legal rights of parties to a transaction, it only
contemplates those instruments which will effectuate the actual transfer of title.
The public interest, except in extreme cases, is against permitting title companies
or real estate brokers to prepare these latter instruments. Both brokers and title
companies, unlike the lawyer, have a divided loyalty. Only the lawyer can assure
that degree of competency and detachment to which parties to a real estate trans-
action are entitled.
George A. Pelletier, Jr.
116 Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950).
117 Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
118 Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, caert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (Ark. 1959).
119 Bar Ass'n of Tenn. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1959); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954); La Brun v.
Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
